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The Use of Big Data Analytics by the
IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End of
Privacy as We Know It?

Kimberly A. Houser* and Debra Sanders**

ABSTRACT

This Article examines the privacy issues resulting from the IRS's
big data analyticsprogram as well as the potential violations of federal
law. Although historically, the IRS chose tax returns to audit based on
internal mathematical mistakes or mismatches with third party
reports (such as W-2s), the IRS is now engaging in data mining of
public and commercial data pools (including social media) and
creating highly detailed profiles of taxpayers upon which to run data
analytics. This Article argues that current IRS practices, mostly
unknown to the general public are violating fair informationpractices.
This lack of transparency and accountability not only violates federal
law regarding the government's data collection activities and use of
predictive algorithms, but may also result in discrimination. While the
potential efficiencies that big data analyticsprovides may appear to be
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a panacea for the IRS's budget woes, unchecked, these activities are a
significant threat to privacy. Other concerns regardingthe IRS's entrie
into big data are raised including the potential for political targeting,
data breaches, and the misuse of such information. This Article
intends to bring attention to these privacy concerns and contribute to
the academic and policy discussions about the risks presented by the
IRS's data collection, mining and analytics activities.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Although tax evasion cost the US government over $3 trillion
during the first decade of the 2000s,1 the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) budget was cut 17% and employees were reduced by 14% in
2010.2 At the same time, there has been a 7% increase in tax returns
filed as well as the passage of two statutes increasing the IRS's
workload: the Implement Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 3 In response, the
Office of Compliance Analytics was created in 2011 as a new division
The office is charged with developing an advanced
of the IRS.
analytics program, relying on the use of big data and predictive
algorithms to reduce tax fraud.
According to Jeff Butler, the Associate Director of Data
Management at the IRS Research, Analysis, and Statistics
Organization:
The IRS uses a wide range of analytic methods, tools, and technologies to address
such problems as ID theft, refund fraud, inventory optimization, and other
activities related to its statutory mandates. In an era of persistently reduced
budgets, the use of data analytics has become more important than ever to drive
4
innovation, risk management, and decision making across the agency.

The IRS uses big data analytics to mine commercial and public data
pools including social media sites (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, and
Twitter). 5 This data is then added to its proprietary data bases, and
1.

Federal Revenue

Lost

to

Tax

Evasion,

DEMOS,

http://www.demos.org/data-

byte/federal-revenue-lost-tax-evasion [https://perma.cc/TMP9-GZB9] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
Chuck Marr & Cecile Murray, IRS Funding Cuts Compromise Taxpayer Service and
2.
Weaken

Enforcement,

CTR.

ON

BUDGET

&

POL'Y

PRIORITIES

(Apr.

4,

2016),

http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/irs-funding-cuts-compromise-taxpayer-service-and-

weaken-enforcement [https://perma.cclW6GU-PBGB].
Id.
3.
4.
Sean Robinson, Wise Practitioner- Predictive Analytics Interview Series: Jeff Butler
at IRS Research, Analysis, and Statistics Organization, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS TIMES (Sept. 2,

2015),
http://www.predictiveanalyticsworld.com/patimes/wise-practitioner-predictive-analytics
-interview-series-jeff-butler-at-irs-research-analysis-and-statistics-organizationO9220 15/6243/
[https://perma.cc/9KPH-94PB].
Dara Kerr, Tax Dodgers Beware: IRS Could Be Watching Your Social Media, CNET
5.
(Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/tax-dodgers-beware-irs-could-be-watching-your-social
-medial [https://perma.ce/2UFZ-GJTB]; see also Tim Sampson, FYI, the IRS Is Looking at Your
16,
2014),
(Apr.
DOT
Evasion, DAILY
of
Tax
Signs
Online Activity for
[https://perma.cc/F33W-M9FL];
http://www.dailydot.com/news/irs-social-media-tax-evasion/
Report: IRS Data Mining Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Other Social Media Sites, CBSDC
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pattern recognition algorithms are run to identify potential
noncompliant taxpayers. 6 Data analytics has proven to be a useful
tool in successfully identifying fraud victims, and, according to the
IRS, computer identification of noncompliant taxpayers is less
subjective than other methods.7 However, the IRS is less forthcoming
about its use of data analytics in deciding whom to audit; the decision
is based on private, highly detailed profiles of each US taxpayer,
created from sources other than the taxpayer's returns and third party
reports.8 Also, the question remains as to whether the data upon
which algorithms rely is accurate and if the algorithms themselves
may result in discrimination. Overall, the collection and use of this
data without proper oversight and the increasing reliance on machine
generated decisions may result in harm.
This Article will explore a number of potential issues
pertaining to the IRS's use of big data and predictive algorithms. Part
II explains data collection by the IRS, the history of improper audits,
and how the IRS selects returns for audit. Part III outlines the legal
issues raised by the IRS's data collection activities and their use of
predictive analytics. Part IV discusses the potential for misuse of data
and algorithms by the IRS. Part V provides the conclusion.

II. THE IRS
The IRS is the branch of the United States Department of
Treasury that is responsible for administering the Internal Revenue
Code and enforcing tax law.9 Income taxes were introduced to the
United States in 1913 when the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted.1 0
While the Treasury Department collects the taxes, the IRS is
responsible for examining the tax returns for accuracy and bringing
criminal action against those who file incorrect returns." Each tax
return is checked internally for mathematical accuracy and
consistency, regardless of whether it is submitted via mail or
(Apr. 16, 2014), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/04/16/report-irs-data-mining-facebook
-twitter-instagram-and-other-social-media-sites/ [https://perma.cc/8G4W-GEZ3].
6.
Kerr, supranote 5.
7.
See Robinson, supra note 4.
8.
The IRS has released very little information about the Office of Compliance
Analytics. Id.
9.
Internal Revenue Service, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/internal
-revenue-service [https://perma.cclZEW8-8JEN] (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
10.
A Brief History, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/brief-history-of-irs [https://perma.cc/
SR5R-VAFF] (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
11.
The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/the
-agency-its-mission-and-statutory-authority [https://perma.cc/L4V9-W3NV (last updated July
27, 2016).
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electronically. 12 The IRS also compares the submitted returns to
third-party materials that are required to be filed with the IRS, such
as W-2s and 1099s. 1 3 Today the IRS is taking advantage of the large
amount of data that can be purchased from data brokers as well as
amassing its own data sets.14
A. IRS Data Collection
Prior to discussing the potential issues with the IRS's use of
data analytics, it is important to understand what data it is collecting
and from where it is collecting that data. While the IRS may request
information from taxpayers to support the information provided on
their tax returns, 15 individuals are having to consider the
constitutionality of the IRS collecting and maintaining information on
taxpayers from sources other than the taxpayer and prior to an audit.
Even though a taxpayer is required to maintain the proof necessary to
support any line item on a tax return, the taxpayer need not provide
support along with her return, nor would she need to support an
allowed deduction, such as the payment of mortgage interest, if she
instead chose to take the standard deduction or simply not take the
deduction at all. 16 While the burden is on the taxpayer to support
their return, the IRS does not have unlimited power to obtain any
data it desires regarding a taxpayer.
It is well known that the IRS is able to obtain information from
third parties to verify line items on tax returns provided by
taxpayers.17 An example would be a W-2 from an employer. However,
the right to third party information is not unlimited. Only recently
have privacy scholars begun to examine these issues when it comes to
electronic and phone communications.1 8 Most of the rules permitting
the IRS to obtain records from third parties were written prior to the
existence of social media, and certainly prior to the current state of
"Modern technologies are creating 'minutely detailed
technology.
records' of our existence, increasingly facilitating the 'persistent,

William J. Hunter & Michael A. Nelson, An IRS Production Function, 49 NAT'L TAX
12.
J. 105, 105-15 (1996).
Id.
13.
14.
Robinson, supra note 4; see also National Research Program (NRP), IRS (Aug. 18,
2012), https://www.irs.gov/uac /national-research-program-nrp [https://perma.cc/X8HP-SGC2].
I.R.C. § 7602(a) (2016). The IRS may also investigate sources of income from those
15.
who fail to file any tax return. See I.R.C. § 6651 (2016).
See Beatty v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 438 (1980).
16.
I.R.C. § 7602(a).
17.
18.
Jonathan P. West & James S. Bowman, Electronic Surveillance at Work, 48 ADMIN.
& SOC'Y 628, 628 (2014).
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continuous and indiscriminate monitoring of our daily lives."' 19 The
existence of data brokers and the ability to purchase information
about pretty much anyone over the Internet has created a situation
where users are losing control over who sees their once private
information. 20 This is especially unsettling when that viewer is the

IRS.
1. Phone Records
According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the
IRS is one of the agencies that purchased cell phone tracking
technology in 2009 and 2012.21
This phone tracking technology,
known as Stingray, masks as a cell tower to trap metadata and
content from cell phones that connect to them. This technology means
the IRS has the ability to record phone conversations, text messages,
and track the location of individuals using their cell phones without
anyone being aware of this tracking. 22 Legal scholars believe that the
IRS will increasingly rely on surveillance technology to reduce
noncompliance. 2 3 A case is currently being heard in Maryland
regarding the constitutionality of the government's use of the Stingray
cell tracking device. 24 Although in 2015 the Department of Justice
(DOJ) issued a guidance statement for the department's law
enforcement constituents, 25 these guidelines do not apply to the IRS. 2 6
19.
Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance:An Agenda, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 319,
322 (2015) (quoting Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013) and Neil M.
Richards, The Dangersof Surveillance, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1934 (2013)).
20.
See Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and
Google Sell You to Advertisers, PC WORLD (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.pcworld.com/
article/2986988/privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-google- sell-you-toadvertisers.html [https://perma.cc/2VX6-PKFF].
21.
Steve Straehley & Danny Biederman, Even the IRS Has Spied on American Citizens,
ALLGov (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/even-the-irs-has-spied-onamerican-citizens-151029?news=857740 [https://perma.cc/CT98-HX79].
22.
Kay Bell, IRS Using Cellphone Scrapers to Gather Data, BANKRATE (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.bankrate.com/financing/taxes/irs-using-cell-phone-scrapers-to-gatherdata/#ixzz4JhlKj7p5 [https://perma.cc/9P83-BZQZ].
23.
Hatfield, supranote 19, at 337.
24.
Rebecca McRay, A Lawsuit Could Rein in the Government's Use of Secret
Surveillance Tools,
TAKEPART (Feb. 7,
2016),
http://www.takepart.comlarticle/2016/
02/07/stingray-lawsuits-maryland [https://perma.cc/ZE57-CVAV]; see also EPIC v. FBI - Stingray
/

Cell

Site

Simulator, ELECTRONIC

PRIVACY

INFO.

CTR.,

http://epic.org/foialfbilstingray/

[https://perma.ccM2BR-MLJ8] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
25.
Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Joins FBI, DEA & Other Federal Agencies with Access to
Cellphone Surveillance Technology, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kellyphillipserb/2015/10/26/irs-joins-fbi-dea-other-federal-agencies-with-access-to-cellphonesurveillance-technology/#2da5c5b77377 [https://perma.cc/AEB2-KFNL].
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2. Emails
Pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in
2013, the ACLU discovered that the IRS had been reading taxpayers'
private emails without a warrant. 27 The 2011 IRS auditor's training
manual indicated that investigators could obtain everything in an
account using an Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
court order except for unopened email or voicemail stored with a
provider for 180 days or less. 28 This policy is in direct contravention of
the 2010 ruling in United States v. Warshak, which reaffirmed that
citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their emails and
that the government needs a warrant to obtain them. 29 It should be
noted that an ECPA court order can be issued fairly easily and does
not require "probable cause" that a criminal statute has been
violated. 30 In response to a Senate Finance Committee hearing, the
IRS agreed to stop reading taxpayers' emails without a warrant 31 but
was notably silent about its social media activities.
3. Social Media
According to a spokesperson for the UC-Berkeley Samuelson
Clinic, the IRS confirmed in response to a FOIA request that it is
collecting information from social media sites. 32 An IRS training
document mentions Facebook, MySpace, and YouTube as possible

The IRS falls under the purview of the Treasury Department, not the Department of
26.
Justice. The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, supra note 11.
27.
Nathan F. Wessler, New Document Suggests IRS Reads Emails Without a Warrant,
ACLU (Apr. 10, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/new-documents-suggest-irs-reads-emailswithout-warrant?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/new-documents-suggestirs-reads-emails-without-warrant [https://perma.cc/3SYX-CGQT].
28.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., MANUAL TRANSMITTAL 9.4.9,

§

9.4.9.5.3.4(1) (2011),

https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/manual-transmittal-re-irm-949?redirect=nationalsecurity/manual-transmittal-re-irm-949 [https://perma.cc/4RXL-AG84]. For unopened email or
voicemail stored with a provider for 180 days or less, the manual did indicate that a warrant was
required. Id. § 9.4.9.5.3.4(1), (2).
29.
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010).
I.R.C. § 2702(d) (2016) only requires facts that show the content is relevant to an
30.
ongoing investigation.
Tim Sampson, IRS Reverses Course on Warrantless Email Snooping, DAILY DOT
31.
(Apr. 17, 2013 4:40 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/news/irs-email-warrantless-snooping-reversall
[https://perma.cc/S54F-YZ8K].
32.
Jaikumar Vijayan, IRS, DOJ Use Social Media Sites to Track Deadbeats, Criminal
Activity, COMPUTER WORLD (May 16, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2516372/web
-apps/irs--doj-use-social-media-sites-to-track-deadbeats-criminal-activity.html
[https://perma.ccL9GA-JSKY].
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sources for taxpayer information.3 3 According to CNET, the IRS uses
"online activity trackers to look though mass amounts of public
Internet data for potentially incriminating information." 34 The IRS
has also used evidence from Google Maps in a Tax Court case to
revoke the 501(c)(4) tax exempt status of a homeowners' association. 35
There is, of course, a difference between locating publicly available
information online about a taxpayer who is being audited and data
mining for potential tax violators prior to the time the taxpayer has
The IRS is reported to have used
been selected for an audit.
automated computer programs (sometimes known as spiders) to sort
through social media sites. 36
4. Data Mining
Data mining involves the analysis of large data sets, which
have been collected for a purpose other than that for which they are
being analyzed, 37 in order to search the data sets for previously
unknown relationships in the data.38 Data mining can be descriptive
or predictive: descriptive data mining summarizes properties of the
data set, 39 while predictive data mining performs analysis on a data
set to build a model that makes predictions about data that is not
available. 40 The IRS engages in data mining in order to develop
analytics and algorithms to identify tax compliance issues. 41
According to an IRS report: "It is not possible to have compliance
experts review every possible set of related tax returns. . . . Active
learning can be used to refine targeting models. Common connections
between possibly abusive transactions can be used to identify

FRONTIER
Content
2009,
ELECTRONIC
33.
IRT-WBT
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social-network/training-course.pdf
R6TM].

FOUND.

12

(2009),

[https://perma.cc/ER9P-

34.

Sampson, supra note 5.

35.
36.

Id.
Report: IRS Data Mining Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Other Social Media

Sites, supra note 5.
37.

DAVID HAND, HEIKKI MANNILA & PADHRAIC SMYTH, PRINCIPLES OF DATA MINING 1

(2001).
RAMESH SHARDA, DURSUN DELEN & EFRAIM TURBAN,
38.
BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 680 (9th ed. 2011).
39.

DECISION SUPPORT AND

JAIWEi HAN & MICHELINE M. KAMBER, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 15

(2d ed. 2006).
40.
Michael Wu, Big Data Reduction 2: UnderstandingPredictive Analytics, LITHIUM
(Mar. 25, 2013), http://community.lithium.com/t5/Science-of-Social-blog/Big-Data-Reduction-2Understanding-Predictive-Analytics/ba-p/79616 [https://perma.ccMZV7-Q966].
41.

DAVID DEBARR & MAURY HARWOOD, RELATIONAL MINING FOR COMPLIANCE RISK 175

(2004), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil04debarr.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AP2-9PCP].
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potential promoters of these transactions." 42 Sources have disclosed
that the IRS is using data mining to create more detailed profiles of
"If Nike is analyzing my information, the worst
taxpayers. 43
consequence is that they market stuff to me that I don't want and it's
annoying," stated Behnam Dayanim, co-chair of the privacy and data
practice at Paul Hastings, "[i]f the government does it, the worst
consequence is there could be legal ramifications, whether it's fines,
penalties, or imprisonment." 44 Concerns about agency use of data
mining were also discussed in the Senate hearings regarding the
Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007.45 The hearing
report indicated that there were 199 different government data
mining programs, including the IRS, and that there was very little
control over these activities. 46
B. History of ImproperAudits
One of the concerns with the IRS's unprecedented access to
private information is the IRS's history of misusing the audit function.
An audit is intended to ensure tax compliance; the IRS audits returns
to check for mathematical errors, document mismatching, and
noncompliance. 4 7 However, since the creation of the IRS, government

42.

Id. at 183.

&

43.
Richard Satran, IRS High-Tech Tools Track Your Digital Footprints, U.S. NEWS
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutual(Apr. 4, 2013),
WORLD REP.
funds/articles/2013/04/04/irs-high-tech-tools-track-your-digital-footprints
[https://perma.ccfWUC5-86TJ]; see also Stacey Vanek Smith, When the IRS Likes' Your Facebook
Update, MINN. PUB. RADIO: MARKETPLACE (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.marketplace.org/
2014/04/14/economy/when-irs-likes-your-facebook-update [https://perma.cc/MZV7-Q966].
Smith, supra note 43.
44.
Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of Government Data
45.
Mining Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg33226/html/CHRG-110shrg33226.htm
[https://perma.cclWK2T-BURL].
Id. According to the 2015 Annual Privacy and Data Mining Report, the IRS indicates
46.
that it consolidates two reporting requirements to provide Congress and the public with a more
comprehensive overview of the Treasury's privacy compliance and oversight activities: (1) The
annual privacy report required by Section 522(a) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005;
and (2) the Data Mining Reporting Act requirement contained in Section 803 of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2015 ANNUAL PRIVACY AND DATA MINING REPORT 5, 7
(2015), https://www.treasury.gov/privacy/annual-reports/Documents/Annual%20Privacy%20and

[https://perma.cc/WGJ4-EMT4]
%20Data%2OMining%2OReport%2OFiscal%2OYear%202015.pdf
(alleging that everything they do complies with the law but not detailing the exact nature of
their data mining activities, which would seem to be the purpose of requiring the report).
https://www.irs.gov[Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self
IRS,
Audits,
IRS
47.
-Employed/IRS-Audits [https://perma.ce/5R48-W2KL] (last updated Mar. 23, 2017).
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officials, particularly presidents, have been using the IRS for their
own political agendas. 48
President Franklin D. Roosevelt set the stage for presidents
using the IRS as a weapon to investigate political rivals and business
opponents. 49 Roosevelt's victims included Senator Huey Long, United
Mine Workers leader John Lewis, Representative Hamilton Fish,
Chicago Tribune publisher Robert "Colonel" McCormick, Philadelphia
Inquirer publisher Moses Annenberg, William Randolph Hearst,
Father Charles Coughlin, and, the former Treasury Secretary Andrew
Mellon.5 0
The latter is especially ironic because Andrew Mellon
utilized the IRS to audit his rivals as Treasury Secretary under
President Calvin Coolidge.5 1
Between 1956 and 1971, the FBI ran a counterintelligence

program called COINTELPRO. 52 The brainchild of then-FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover, its purpose was initially to disrupt, discredit, and
destroy Communist Party activities in the United States. 53 It later
expanded to include other groups such as the Socialist Workers Party
and the Black Panther Party. 54 Under COINTELPRO, the FBI was
able to harass these individuals and organizations by having the IRS
target them for tax audits.5 5 Martin Luther King Jr. was a victim of
this harassment, as was the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People and the National Council of
Churches. 56
When Robert Kennedy, chief counsel for the Senate Select
Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management,
investigated Teamsters leader Jimmy Hoffa in the late 1950s for
illegal activities, he failed to obtain a conviction.5 7 When he was the

48.

Gail Chaddoci, Playing the IRS Card: Six Presidents Who Used the IRS to

Bash Political Foes, CHRISTIAN

SCl. MONITOR

(May 17, 2013),

http://www.csmonitor.com/

USA/Politics/DC-Decoder/2013/05 17/Playing-the-IRS-card-Six-presidents-who-used-the-IRS-to
-bash-political-foes/ [https://perma.cc/F4KU-P5WL].
49.
Id.
50.
Id.; see also The IRS's Long History of Scandal, WEEK (June 8, 2013),
http://theweek.com/articles/463448/irss-long-history-scandal [https://perma.cc/4G4B-TKJB].
51.
Chaddoci, supra note 48.
52.
FBI Records: The Vault, FBI, https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro [https://perma.cc/
WQE9-EH2X] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
55.
OMAR V. GARRISON, COINTELPRO Revisited-"A Rough, Tough Dirty Business", in
PLAYING

DIRTY:

THE

SECRET

WAR

AGAINST

BELIEFS

53-73

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/COINTELPRO/fbi-cofs.html
[https://perma.cc/J3E4-DL6H].
56.
The IRS's Long History of Scandal, supra note 50.
57.
Chaddoci, supra note 48.

(1980),
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Attorney General under President John F. Kennedy, Robert again
sought out Jimmy Hoffa.5 8 One of the tactics used was requesting the
IRS to repeatedly examine his returns and those of his associates for
tax evasion. 59 This tactic was also employed for other alleged
racketeers whom Kennedy had his eye on.60 This targeting of those
believed to be involved in criminal activity raised questions from legal
experts who decried that tax laws are for revenue collection, not
prosecuting criminals, and insisted that audits should be random.6 1
Under the Kennedy administration, IRS investigations extended to
groups with extreme conservative views such as the John Birch
Society. 62 The IRS went so far as to establish the "Ideological
Organizations Audit Project" to target these groups. 63
The President who really excelled at wielding the IRS audit
Besides targeting
weapon against political enemies was Nixon.
left-wing groups, Nixon sought out antiwar groups, churches and
nonprofits supporting antiwar groups, civil rights groups, reporters,
and prominent Democrats. 64 The White House tapes provide direct
evidence of Nixon using the IRS to collect data on potential
Hubert
Democratic presidential candidates, including Senators
Humphrey, Edward (Ted) Kennedy, and Edmund (Ed) Muskie. 65
Nixon had the IRS establish the Special Service Staff unit to utilize
tax records to create dossiers on more than 11,000 individuals and
groups, including supporters of Democrat Presidential nominee
George McGovern for 1972.66 In the House Judiciary Committee's
1974 Articles of Impeachment, one of the articles charged Nixon with
trying to obtain confidential information contained in income tax
returns for purposes not authorized by law, in violation of the
taxpayer's constitutional rights, and causing the selection of audits in
a discriminatory manner. 67
Id.
58.
James Kelly, The Prince and the Pauper, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 7,
59.
[https:/perma.cc/
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-prince-and-the-pauper- 1438979666
2015),
D9UG-UQK9].
60.
Chaddoci, supra note 48.
61.
Id.
The IRS's Long History of Scandal, supra note 50.
62.
Id.
63.
Chaddoci, supra note 48.
64.
Id.
65.
The Nixon Administration and Watergate: Political Subordination of IRS, HIST.
66.
COMMONS,
http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?nixon-and-watergate-tmln-watergate-campaign-c

onspiracy=nixon andwatergate-tmln-political-subordination of irs&timeline=nixon.and.wate
rgate-tmln [https://perma.cc/3YYD-5ACS] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
Chaddoci, supra note 48; see also The IRS's Long History of Scandal, supra note 50.
67.
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There have also been IRS abuses by presidents subsequent to
Nixon. Recently, the IRS singled out conservative organizations with
"tea party" affiliations that were seeking tax-exempt nonprofit status
and subjecting them to extra scrutiny.68 While there may or may not
have been a political motivation for the increased scrutiny, it does
appear that at the very least gross mismanagement was involved.69
Despite the Department of Justice's finding that no criminal conduct
occurred, the House Ways and Means Committee has indicated that it
will continue to investigate the targeting. 70
C. Audit Selection History
Every year the IRS must shift through copious numbers of
taxpayer returns and their related data. In order to ensure tax
compliance, the IRS may audit a tax return to check for mathematical
errors, document mismatching, and noncompliance.7 1 The audit may
be performed through the mail, at the taxpayer's home, or at an IRS
office. 72 Historically, tax returns were selected randomly (based on a
statistical formula), due to a mismatch with third party data, or when
a return was linked to other taxpayers who were being audited
themselves. 73 The majority of audits resulted from mismatches with
third party data. 74 The Information Returns Processing (IRP) System
was responsible for the data received from employers and other third
parties reporting taxpayer income, pensions, interest, and dividends
paid during the tax year.7 5 The IRP would match income reported on
information returns against income reported by taxpayers on their
individual income tax returns based on Social Security numbers.
When mathematical errors, inconsistencies, or a mismatch in the IRP
system was identified, the taxpayer was contacted via mail and a bill
or check was sent to the taxpayer. 76

68.
Andy Kroll, The IRS Tea Party Scandal, Explained, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/irs-tea-party-scandal-congress-nonprofit-obama
[https://perma.cc/TDK5-BLQB].
69.
Evan Perez, First on CNN: DOJ Closes IRS Investigation with No Charges, CNN
POL. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/23/politics/lois-lerner-no-charges-doj-tea
-party/ [https://perma.cc/8HME-9M54].
70.
Id.
71.
IRS Audits, supra note 47.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Information Returns Processing, IRS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/
information-returns-processing [https://perma.cc/M6VG-ZQYB].
76.
Id.
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The rate of audits increased during the 1950s. 77

In the early

1960s over 5.5 percent of tax returns were chosen for audits.7 8 The
rate then began declining due to technological advancements in
The IRS first used
identifying potential tax returns to audit.
computers for selecting tax returns in 1962 and created the Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) two years later.79 The
TCMP randomly selected about 50,000 returns approximately every
three years to perform detailed audits requiring substantiation of each
line on the tax return.8 0 This program initially reviewed delinquent
returns to create a statistical summary, which evolved into an
automated program known as the discriminant function analysis
(DIF). 81 The DIF gives each tax return a score based on the
probability of noncompliance. IRS personnel then manually screen
the tax returns to ensure appropriate selection.8 2 This process
enhanced audit efficiency by allowing the IRS to manually review the
machine scored returns and chose the tax returns with the highest
likelihood of noncompliance while avoiding auditing compliant
returns.8 3 The first tax audits based on the DIF occurred in 1969, and
refinements to the DIF were made during the 1970s and again in the
1980s with the addition of computerized third party document
matching and mathematical accuracy. 84 Analysis of the most common
errors by taxpayers led to policy changes. For example, in 1986 the
TCMP identified a significant misreporting of dependency exemptions
and wrongful claims of the earned income credit by individuals
claiming children that did not qualify. The policy was then changed to
As a result, the
require identification numbers for dependents.
number of dependents claimed in 1987 was 7 million fewer than

77.
78.
79.

Hunter & Nelson, supra note 12, at 105-15.
Id.
Id.

80.

JAMES ALM,

DESIGNING

RESPONSIBLE

REGULATORY

POLICIES TO

ENCOURAGE

TAX COMPLIANCE 8 (2013), http://murphy.tulane.edu/files/events/Alm-DesigningResponsible
RegulatoryPolicies-Murphylnstitute-021113.pdf [https://perma.ccl5YSD-8DQH].
This is the first use of data analytics by the IRS, and it relied on data contained in
81.
the tax returns provided by the taxpayers. Id.
82.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS PUBLICATION 556, EXAMINATION OF RETURNS,
APPEAL RIGHTS, AND CLAIMS FOR REFUND 2 (2013); see also How Tax Returns Are Selected for

L.,
BROTMAN
Scores,
UI
DIF
and
DIF
Scores
Audit:
Explaining
[https://perma.cc/SU89http://info.sambrotman.com/blog/how-tax-returns-are-selected-for-audit/
2RSC] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
83.
Personal Communication with Keith Nelson, Former Criminal Investigator, Internal
Revenue Serv. (Mar. 16, 2016).
Hunter & Nelson, supra note 12, at 105-15.
84.
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claimed in 1986 when identification numbers were not required.8 5 A
similar decrease was found for those claiming an earned income
credit. 86 In the 1980s, when third party reporting became required of
income items such as wages, interest, and dividends, the accuracy of
these amounts on tax returns substantially increased.8 7
Prior to the time the TCMP audit was used, only half of the
audited returns found any errors.8 8 During the time of the TCMP
audits, the percentage of returns chosen for audits containing no
errors (no-change) decreased from over 40 percent in 1968 to about 11
percent in the early 1990s. 89

However, TCMP audits were onerous

because they required the taxpayer to support each line of their tax
return with documentation.9 0 In 1988, the TCMP was eventually
phased out due to cuts in the IRS budget and criticisms by taxpayers,
Congress, and the media. 91 The 1996 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report on the IRS, suggested that the IRS find alternative
methods (to the TCMP) for updating the DIF and develop a long-term
strategy for obtaining compliance data with fewer resources. 92
Supporting the GAO's predictions of the detrimental effects of not
updating the TCMP, the 1994 no-change rate for individual returns
identified by the DIF was over 19 percent, and more than 24 percent

85.
Jeffrey B. Liebman, Who Are the Ineligible EITC Recipients?, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1165,
1171 (2000).
Id.
86.
87.
Jeffrey Dubin, Michael Graetz & Luis L. Wilde, The Effect of Audit Rates on the
FederalIndividual Income Tax, 1977-1986, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 395, 397 (1990).
Hunter & Nelson, supra note 12, at 105-15.
88.
89.

Id.

90.
David Turner, Taxpayers Beware of 'Audit from Hell', ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 12,
1995), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1995-03-12/business/9503100011 l-irs-audit-taxpayercompliance-measurement-regular-audit
[https://perma.cc/3ZUH-L39W]. The IRS eventually
concluded that the TCMP was too costly, burdensome, and time consuming. U.S. GOVT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-769, TAX ADMINISTRATION: NEW COMPLIANCE RESEARCH
EFFORT

Is

ON

TRACK,

BUT

IMPORTANT

WORK

REMAINS

4

(2002),

http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234955.pdf[https://perma.cclMLF6-HPH4]. However, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) determined that limiting the scope of the TCMP was unjustified and
would undermine its benefits. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-95-39, TAX
COMPLIANCE: STATUS OF THE TAX YEAR 1994 COMPLIANCE MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 1-2 (1994).

The TCMP actually lessened the overall burden by decreasing the number of compliant
taxpayers being audited. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-769, supra, at 5. The 1995
TCMP was planned to be the most comprehensive review, with over 150,000 returns audited
covering individuals and small businesses and include more computerized analysis. Id. at 1, 4.
91.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-769, supra note 90, at 1, 4; see also
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-96-89, TAX ADMINISTRATION: ALTERNATIVE
STRATEGIES TO OBTAIN
COMPLIANCE (1996),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/222435.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3SL-BFAA].
92.
Id.
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in 1998.93 By not updating the data upon which the DIF was based, a
greater percentage of compliant taxpayers had to suffer through the
expense and stress of an audit.9 4
Based on concern that the
effectiveness of the DIF was deteriorating and reducing taxpayer
confidence in the fairness of the tax system, in 2002 the IRS initiated
the National Research Program (NRP) to replace the TCMP. 95 The
idea was to increase the quality of the data and better predict which
tax returns would result in a deficiency without the burdensome
TCMP audits. 96
The NRP gathers data learned from random audits to measure
voluntary compliance with tax laws and improve DIF audit selection
methods. 9 7 This data is used for analytical purposes such as
identifying tax issues, reporting characteristics, and taxpayer
segments that may lead to noncompliant behavior. 98 The rationale for
performing this type of analytics is that efficiency in the audit process
reduces unnecessary audits for compliant taxpayers. Today, the IRS
uses big data analytics to target their audits on tax returns more
likely to result in tax deficiencies. 99

&

93.
David Blattner & Robert Johnson, IRS National Research Program, 4 J. TAX PRAC.
PROC. 9, 9 (2002).
94.

Id.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-423, USING DATA FROM THE INTERNAL
95.
REVENUE SERVICE'S NATIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAM TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES TO

REDUCE THE TAX GAP 1-2 (2007); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-614, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS IS IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAM AS PLANNED, at i

(2003). The NRP was developed to provide compliance data for updating the DIF to improve
targeting noncompliant audits while minimizing the burden on taxpayers selected for the data
collection audits. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-614, supra, at 1-2. It was also
intended to identify potential methods for improving voluntary compliance. U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-423, supra, at 1-2. About 46,000 tax returns were audited and

of those, 8,000 were audited using information already in the possession of the IRS without
contacting the taxpayer and another 9,000 were completed through letter correspondence. U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-614, supra, at 19. The approximately 17,000 audits with
minimal taxpayer contact were possible through a process called case-building, gathering IRS
and third-party information to verify tax return data. Id. at 1, 19. The taxpayer was contacted
for support for only those items that could be verified. Id. at 19.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-423, supra note 95, at 1; see also U.S.
96.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-614, supra note 95, at 1.

97.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-423, supra note 95, at 1-2.

98.

Id.

Historically, the IRS used data from taxpayers and third parties. Id. Today the IRS
99.
is using big data purchased from data brokers and the internet, as well as other questionable
sources. Jeff Butler, Dir., Research Databases, IRS, Big Data and Analytics at the
IRS, Address at the Techamerica Big Data Commission: Demystifying Big Data 5
14,
2012),
https://www-01.ibm.com/events/wwe/grp/grpOO4.nsf/vLookupPDFs/Jeff%/
(Nov.
[https://perma.cc/3NLN
20Butler's%2OPresentation/$file/Jeff%/20Butler's%20Presentation.pdf
-NHHK].
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Becoming more efficient has become increasingly important as
the budget for the IRS continues to decrease. Since 2010, the budget
has been cut by 17 percent and staff has decreased by 14 percent.10 0
This has caused a decrease in compliance monitoring. 10 1 In fact, the
number of audits dropped to an eleven-year low in 2015,102 in which
the IRS collected $3.3 trillion in revenue and processed about 243
million tax returns. 103 This corresponded to 35 cents spent for each
hundred dollars it collected. 104 Although the IRS is one of the world's
most efficient tax administrations,1 0 5 IRS Commissioner John
Koskinen stated that there comes a point when it is not possible to
keep doing more with less without jeopardizing the mission of the
IRS.10 6 He also projected that with a larger budget, the IRS could
increase the amount of taxes collected. 0 7 In his written statement,
Koskinen added, "I don't know any organization in my 20 years of
experience in the private sector that has said, 'I think I'll take my
revenue operation and starve it for funds to see how it does."' 10 8 It is
estimated that for every dollar decrease in the IRS budget, there are
five dollars owed that are not collected.1 09
Most of the changes the IRS has made to address their budget
10
shortfall rely on the increased use of technology.o
For the 2015
tax return filing season, around 90 percent of the returns were filed
electronically, thus reducing the need for data entry employees.1 11 In
2005 electronic filings comprised only 50 percent of the total. 112
The IRS uses the Automated Under-Reporter Program to match

100.
Marr & Murray, supra note 2.
101.
Daniel Bendtsen, As IRS Budget Shrinks, So Does the Number of Audits, DESERET
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://national.deseretnews.com/article/6928/as-irs-budget-shrinks-sodoes-the-number-of-audits.html [https://perma.cc/6D57-JEYFJ.
102.
Id.
103.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2015, at iii

(2015). The 243 million includes all tax returns such as income, employment taxes, excise, etc.
104.
The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, supra note 11.
105.
Id.
106.
William Hoffman, Koskinen Pledges Transparency and Accountability in
Confirmation Hearing, TAX ANALYSTS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/
koskinen-pledges-transparency-and-accountability-confirmation-hearing [https://perma.cc/E4SLWLND].
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Satran, supranote 43.
111.
U.S.
Taxpayers E-filed More than 128 Million Returns in 2016,
EFILE.COM,
http://www.efile.comlefile-tax-return-direct-deposit-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/
VB3M-CJXJ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
112.
Id.
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third-party information reports with tax returns and contact
taxpayers via letters to resolve discrepancies. 1 13 In 2015, the IRS
received 2.6 billion third-party information reports, of which over 87
percent were filed electronically. The ability to easily verify tax return
information allowed the IRS to resolve more than 3.7 million tax
return discrepancies in 2015, resulting in more than $6.3 billion. 1 14
All of this was accomplished with the equivalent of only 1,739 fulltime employees-approximately a $3.6 million increase in post-audit
collections per employee.1 15
Data analytics is being touted as the solution to the IRS's
budget problems. Part of the IRS's data analytics program examines
source data to identify noncompliant tax returns going beyond
information provided by the taxpayer and the third party sources
required to submit information (such as employers providing W-2s). 1 16
The IRS asserts that with analytics it can improve efficiencies and
effectiveness of its investigations and avoid wasting taxpayers' time or
creating unnecessary burdens on them.1 17 Koskinen opined that
without analytics, the future of the IRS would not be possible.1 1 8
According to Dean Silverman, at that time the IRS's senior adviser to
the commissioner for the Office of Compliance Analytics, the IRS is
expanding its source data resources to include credit and debit card
processors, PayPal, social media, and other Internet data. 119

113.

Gerard H. Schreiber Jr., IRS Automated UnderreporterInitiative, TAX ADVISOR (Jan.

http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2009/janlirsautomatedunderreporter.html
1,
2009),
[https://perma.cc/2JQP-VAHY].
114.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 103, at 37.

115.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 37.
116.
Id.
117.
Excerpt from Commissioner John Koskinen's Senate Finance Committee Testimony:
118.
Planning for the Future of the Taxpayer Experience, IRS (Feb.
10,
2016),
[https://perma.cc/5DC8-PD5H].
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/FSTaxpayerInteraction.pdf
For example, the IRS developed the data analytics program named Automated Substitute for
Returns as a way to use third party information reports to identify non-filers, construct tax
returns for them, and assess taxes, interest, and penalties. The IRS finalized more than 600,000
cases resulting in $2.7 billion in additional assessments. With ninety-three full-time equivalent
employees for this program, the additional amount collected per employee after an audit is just
over $29 million. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 103, at 37-38.
for
Compliance,
Fraud
IRS
Implements
Analytics
119.
Tam
Habert,
Detection and Workforce Management, DATA-INFORMED (Sept. 19, 2012), http://datainformed.com/irs-implements-analytics-for-compliance-fraud-detection-and-workforcemanagement/ [https://perma.cc/ACX8-NBVV].
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III. POTENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES

This section explores the legal issues arising due to the IRS's
data collection activities and analytics program. These include the
failure to comply with fair information practices, the lack of
transparency in the algorithm structure resulting in violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act and potential discrimination, due
process issues involving the collection of data without a warrant by
the government, and other potential violations of federal statutes.
A. FairInformation Practices
According to Fred Cate, a privacy expert at Indiana University,
the standard for data collection over the Internet is "notice and
consent"; 120 individuals should be informed that data is being collected
about them and given the opportunity to correct such data. 121 In the
beginning of the computer age, the US Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare issued a report concerning the government's
collection of data on individuals, which set standards known as the
Fair Information Practices (FIPs). 122 These FIPs were revised by the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
have been the basis of many federal, state and international privacy
regulations. 123 The FIPs have been adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) as the "five core principles of privacy protection"
and specifically name the notice-and-consent requirements as the
basis of legal information privacy protection. 124 The main tenets of the
FIPs are that (1) there should be no secret data collection systems; (2)
there should be a way for data subjects to find out what information is
in their records and how it is used; (3) data collected for one purpose
should not be used for another without user permission; (4) the data
subject should have the ability to correct inaccuracies; and (5) the data
collector should keep reliable records and protect them. 125 The FTC
continues to support this control by citizens over how their personal

120.

VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 153 (2014); see also

Fred H. Cate & Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Notice and Consent in a World of Big Data, 3 INT'L
DATA PRIVACY L. 67, 67-73 (2013).
121.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 153; see also Cate & Mayer-

Schonberger, supra note 120, at 67-73.
122.
Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1969 (2013).
Susan Landau, Control Use of Data to Protect Privacy, 347 SCIENCE 504, 504 (2015).
123.
124.

See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998).

125.

Landau, supra note 123, at 504.
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information is used, and the FIPs are specifically incorporated into the
Privacy Act of 1974, discussed in Section III.D.1.

12 6

1. No Notice
"It's well-known in the tax community, but not many people
outside of it are aware of this big expansion of data and computer use
[by the IRS]," says Edward Zelinsky, a tax law expert and professor at
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and Yale Law School. 127 "I am
sure people will be concerned about the use of personal information on
databases in government, and those concerns are well-taken. It's
appropriate to watch it carefully. There should be safeguards." 12 8
Zelinsky went on to say that taxpayers should be made aware that
what they say and do online could be used against them in IRS
enforcement actions. 129 There have been instances of the IRS pointing
to Facebook posts in defending their audit position that seem to
support this statement. 130 Although the IRS website in no way reveals
this to taxpayers, Dean Silverman, former Senior Advisor to the
Commissioner in the Office of Compliance Analytics for the Internal
Revenue Service, indicated that the IRS uses big data for the
followingl 31 :
* Charting and analyzing social media such as Facebook
* Targeting audits by matching tax filings to social media or
electronic payments
* Tracking individual Internet addresses and emailing patterns
* Sorting data in 32,000 categories of metadata and 1 million unique
"attributes"
126.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE,

at i (2012).

127.
Satran, supra note 43.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
IRS Has More Powers than Ever Before, Monitors Facebook, EBay, NEWSMAX
130.
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/irs-expanded-powersPM),
1:10
2013,
13,
(May
facebook/2013/05/13/id/504195/ [https://perma.cclKLJ3-YFJF].
Satran, supra note 43.
131.
The IRS has brought in private industry experts to employ similar digital
tracking-but with the added advantage of access to Social Security numbers,
health records, credit card transactions and many other privileged forms of
information that marketers don't see. 'Private industry would be envious if they
knew what our models are,' boasted Dean Silverman, the agency's high-tech top
gun who heads a group recruited from the private sector to update the IRS, in a
comment reported in trade publications.
Id.
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* Machine learning across "neural" networks
* Statistical and agent-based modeling
* Relationship analysis based on Social Security numbers and other
132
personal identifiers.
Nowhere in Facebook's terms of use, 133 or most likely on any
social media site, is a provision indicating that users consent to the
use of their information by the IRS. By making their posts private,
Facebook users should be able to keep the IRS from accessing their
information without a warrant; however, as previously noted, IRS
agents were obtaining emails without a warrant as recently as
2013.134 Although they agreed to stop this activity, they were silent
with respect to accessing social media accounts,1 3 5 and it seems pretty
clear that the IRS has not provided adequate notice to tax payers of
their data collection activities.
2. No Secret Data Collection Systems
There is little information available from the Treasury
Department about the IRS's use of predictive analytics to conduct
targeted audits. 13 6 A search of irs.gov comes up with only one hit for
the name of the sub-agency responsible for these searches, the Office
of Compliance Analytics, and that is on the back page of the 2014
Data Book.137
When the IRS uses electronic information about
taxpayers without their consent, the public does not have a way to
check the information collected nor correct any mistakes in the
information 3 8 that the IRS is using to determine whether they will be
audited.139 This lack of transparency also violates FIP requirements
that there be no secret data collection activity. 140

Id.
132.
133.
See
Data
Policy,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.comlabout/privacy
[https://perma.cc/SXU8-LJKJ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). Facebook does indicate that it will
comply with a court order, subpoena, or search warrant and provide non-PII aggregated data to
its analytics partners. Id.
134.
Wessler, supra note 27.
135.
IRT-WBT Content 2009, supra note 33, at 2-5.
136.
See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BIG DATA ANALYTIcS (2014),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/BDA-pia.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KS7-NAFT].
137.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2014, at 74
(2014),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf ga=1.199391210.597763954.1471625859
[https://perma.cc/JUP3-ZVVK].
138.
See infra Section III.B.2 for how these mistakes can occur.
139.
See Hatfield, supranote 19, at 349.
140.
See infra Section III.D.1 regarding how this violates the Privacy Act of 1974.
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In addition to the secrecy surrounding IRS data mining, they
are also keeping the algorithms themselves secret. The reason is to
prevent taxpayers from gaming the system by understanding the
nature of the audit selection and working around it.141 There are,
however, enormous legal issues with respect to the failure of the IRS
to disclose the algorithm structure. 142 Transparency is required by
law with respect to predictive analytics because of the potential for
violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
discriminatory decisions. 143 The Taxpayer Reform Act of 1998 also
mandates IRS transparency. 14 4 The IRS bases its secrecy on the
following language in the Taxpayer Reform Act:
Such statement shall not include any information the disclosure of which would be
detrimental to law enforcement, but shall specify the general procedures used by
the Internal Revenue Service, including whether taxpayers are selected for
examination on the basis of information available in the media or on the basis of
14 5
information provided to the Internal Revenue Service by informants.

However, the inability of individuals, entities, and even other
branches of government to review the algorithms used by the IRS may
be resulting in violations of law that are undiscoverable.

141.
"Courts have concluded that the release of a taxpayer's DIF scores could reasonably
be expected to risk circumvention of the law, as provided in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E), in that the
release of such scores could enable taxpayers to determine how to lower DIF scores in order to
avoid audits." Huene v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 2:11-cv-02109 JAM KJN PS, 2012 WL
3730635, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012), quoted in Tal Z. Zarsky, TransparentPredictions, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1512 n.54 (2013), https://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr
-content/articles/2013/4/Zarsky.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6EE-VSLD].
142.
See Richard Satran, What Does the IRS Know About You?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Apr.

12,

2013,

9:00

AM),

http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutual

-funds/articles/2013/04/12/what-does-the-irs-know-about-you
[https://perma.cc/XX45-V9HE].
Accounting firms are also in the dark about these new practices, even though the ones that are
aware admit they do not know how these algorithms work. See id.
143.

There are numerous statutes addressing the need for transparency in government

action, including but not limited to the Privacy Act of 1974, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act, and the E-Government Act, which also
addresses the issues surrounding automated prediction processes. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. §§ 552, 552a (2012); Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee-3 (2012); E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012); Zarsky, supra note 141, at
1507 n.22.
144.
Section 353 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act, Disclosure of Criteria for
Examination Selection, requires the publication of general criteria for an audit trigger and
informing the audited individual of the factors that triggered the audit. Pub. L. 105-206, § 3503,
112 Stat. 685, 771 (1998).
145.
Id.; H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 295 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 96
(1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, at 74 (1997).
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3. No Consent for Third Party Contact
According to Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, the
IRS is authorized to examine "any book, papers, records, or other data
which may be relevant or material" to determining a taxpayer's tax
liability.146 However, the IRS may not contact a third party for the
determination of a tax liability without providing reasonable notice to
the taxpayer in advance.14 7 The reason for this rule is that the IRS's
inquiry regarding a taxpayer could have negative repercussions on
that taxpayer's reputation. 148 The notice requirement allows the
taxpayer to obtain the information for the IRS or otherwise resolve the
issue in advance, making an IRS inquiry unnecessary. 149 Seeking
information from holders of private electronic communications of a
taxpayer without first providing notice to the tax payer would seem to
violate this provision. 150
4. Loss of Control over Use of Personal Information
While it has long been established that people have the right to
determine when others may collect information about them and how
such information may be used, the standards vary greatly from
country to country. 15 1 The right to privacy was first documented in
the United States in Brandeis and Warren's Harvard Law Review
article "The Right to Privacy." 152 For hundreds of years, the United
States firmly believed that this right not only created a tort action
with respect to disclosures about private individuals but was also
implied in the Constitution to prevent invasive government action.1 53
146.
I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1) (2016). There are statutory exceptions to the requirement of
notifying the taxpayer when a third party is contacted. Id. § 7602(c)(1). These include when
providing notice would jeopardize the tax collection, the person being contacted fears reprisal
from the taxpayer, and when the contact is made with respect to any criminal investigation. Id. §
7602(c)(3).
147.
Id. § 7602(c)(1).
148.
See generally Karen Schiller, THIRD PARTY CONTACTS: IRS Third Party Contact
Procedures Do Not Follow the Law and May Unnecessarily Damage Taxpayers' Businesses and
Reputation,
1
2015
ANNUAL
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
123
(2015),
http://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_VolumelMSP-12Third-Party-Contacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SEA-HRCP].
149.
S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 77.
See supra Section II.A. 1.
150.
151.

ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).

152.
James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 875-76 (1979); Ben
Bratman, Brandeis & Warren's 'The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69
TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002).
Bratman, supra note 152, at 624-26.
153.
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The right to privacy regarding health care and financial records has
been long established; the government must be able to justify their
need for such information.15 4 Financial information is considered
personal and disclosure tends to cause concern and anxiety in a
reasonable person. 15 5 Individuals have the right to determine who can
access such information. 156 Courts must weigh the government's
interest in obtaining the information against an individual's right of
privacy. 157
When individuals provide information to a website, even if
consent is given for the initial use of such data, a problem arises when
that same data is being subjected to a secondary use. 15 8 This is
because consent is not being given for these secondary uses, as such
use is not envisioned at the time the consent is given. 159 There are
cases where the US Tax Court has used information obtained by the
In Orellana v.
IRS investigators from Facebook and eBay.
Commissioner, the taxpayer did not report the income she received
from sales made on eBay. 160 The IRS subpoenaed various eBay and
PayPal records to recreate the amount of unreported income. 161 In a
different, much publicized 2014 case, 162 Rashia Wilson obtained tax
refunds based on false information and was discovered because of her
Facebook posts. 16 3 According to the CPA Practice Advisor, the IRS
conducted searches of Wilson's public Facebook accounts to obtain the

James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
154.
113 YALE L.J. 1153, 1189-95 (2004).
155.
Id. at 1193.
156.

Ferdinand

Schoeman,

Privacy and Intimate Information,

in PHILOSOPHICAL

DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403, 406 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) ("I
think that what makes things private is in large part their importance to our conceptions of
ourselves and to our relationships with others.... Selective self-disclosure provides the means
through which people envalue personal experiences which are intrinsically or objectively
valueless."), cited in Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The
Emerging Unencumbered ConstitutionalRight to Information Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479,
507 n.92 (1990).
157.
See, e.g., Belle Bonfils Mem'1 Blood Ctr. v. Dist. Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1014 (Colo.
1988), cited in Turkington, supranote 156, at 513 n.108.
Joseph Jerome, Big Data: Catalyst for a Privacy Conversation, 48 IND. L. REV. 213,
158.
236-39 (2014).
See Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1543; Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade
159.
Comm'n, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum: The Privacy
Challenges of Big Data: A View From The Lifeguard's Chair 5 (Aug. 19, 2013).
160.
Orellana v. Comm'r, No. 8950-08S, 2010 WL 1568447, at *2 (T.C. Apr. 20, 2010).
161.
Id. at *6.
U.S. v. Wilson, 593 F. App'x 942 (11th Cir. 2014).
162.
Elaine Silvestrini, IRS Says Woman Bragged About Tax Fraud on Facebook, TAMPA
163.
http://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/news/10876997/irs-says-woman
2013),
TRIB. (Mar 10,
-bragged-about-tax-fraud-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/LL2A-YXKP].
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damning information. 1 6 4 While the IRS may subpoena records in
connection with an audit, if the IRS is using data mining on Facebook
or other Internet sites to locate potential noncompliant activity, this
would violate, at a minimum, the consent requirement of the FIPs. 165
In addition, even when such information is given anonymously,
the IRS most likely would be able to tie it back to an individual. 166
While website and data brokers may claim the information collected
has been cleaned and anonymized, this does not protect an Internet
user's privacy. 167 Today, search terms entered into a search engine for
a research paper are collected as part of big data. 168 Even data that
does not seem private can be used negatively and can be traced back
to the individual. 169 Re-identification of allegedly anonymous data is
easily accomplished.
When data is first anonymized, personal
information such as names, date of birth, etc. are removed from the
data set. 170 While this works with small data sets, large data sets can
easily result in re-identification. 171
A pair of scholars at the
University of Texas were able to identify Netflix users based on de-

Id.
Richard Satran, The IRS Has More Data About You than Ever Before, U.S. NEWS

&

164.
165.

WORLD REP. (May 13, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-irs-ramps-up-online

-tracking-2013-5 [https://perma.cc/A6JZ-GBYX].
What the IRS does with all the information it can now access is not clear even to the
agency's oversight boards and congressional overseers. The IRS's Information
Reporting Program Advisory Committee, made up of tax professionals and advisers,
in its annual report, raised "many questions" and numerous concerns over how the
agency will use and manage data and said there was "a strong need for guidelines."
The agency's mission statement says it will give "America's taxpayers top-quality
service by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce
the law with integrity and fairness to all." But the agency would make no comment for
a story by U.S. News & World Report in early April that documented the growing
array of new technology the agency has in its arsenal, including a $350 million
investment in data mining tools. The agency declined numerous requests to detail any
portion of its online policies. It did make a statement later to refute a charge not made

in the story, that the IRS targets taxpayers for audit based on their online
information.
Satran, supra note 142.

166.

Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large Datasets

(How to Break Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset), 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY

111,
111
(2008),
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4531148
[https://perma.cclND5X-ASEL].
167.
Nate Anderson, 'Anonymized'DataReally Isn't-and Here's Why Not, ARS TECHNICA
(Sept. 8, 2009, 6:25 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/09/your-secrets-live-online-in
-databases-of-ruin/ [https://perma.cc/SV69-2YMT].
168.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 98-122.

169.
170.
171.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 154.
Id.
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identified data provided by Netflix, who had a contest to determine if a
better movie recommendation system could be developed. 172
University of Colorado Law Professor, Paul Ohm, an expert on the
harm done by de-anonymization, indicates that perfect anonymization
is not possible. 173
"Anonymized" data was long thought of as safe in terms of
individual privacy, but has proved possible of re-identification. 17 4
Re-identification of anonymous data is possible in some instances with
as little information as a name and a birthdate.17 5 By aggregating the
data of individuals from sites such as Netflix, Twitter, and Facebook,
re-identification can be accomplished through a process of
elimination.1 76 This process has been proved multiple times, but
notably by a graduate student, who combined hospital records with
voter data to re-identify the Governor of Massachusetts's17 7 hospital
information.17 8
Google, for example, collects and sells data sets
including "your name, email address, telephone number, credit card (if
you enter it), details on how you use Google's services, how you
interact with other websites that use AdWords and other Google
technologies, your device, [and] search queries ... "1 7 9

The IRS is training auditors to search Internet addresses,
Facebook postings and other social media to back audit
enforcements.18 0 While the one posting on social media sites or
providing information to websites is not contemplating that the IRS
may view the material, it may very well be doing so. Because it has
access to highly personal information about individuals, including
Social Security numbers, income, and expenditure information, the
IRS likely can recreate profiles from anonymized data.18 1 However, a
larger issue is that use of predictive analytics based on data gained
from the Internet may be faulty because individuals often do not post
reliable information on Facebook and other online platforms. 182

172.

Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 166, at 1-2, 10-12.

173.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 1.

174.
Id. at 154-56.
175.
Anderson, supra note 167.
Id.
176.
177.
William Weld was the governor at the time. Id.
Id.
178.
Hachman, supra note 20.
179.
180.
Vince Polley & KnowConnect PLLC, IRS Tracks Your Digital Footprint, A.B.A.
(Apr.
10,
2013),
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2013/05/mirln_1606.shtml
#sthash.W4fetqiK.dpuf [https://perma.cc/B7TA-WSTY].
Satran, supra note 43.
181.
182.
Minas Michikyan, Jessica Dennis & Kaveri Subrahmanyam, Can You Guess Who I
Am? Real, Ideal, and False Self-Presentationon Facebook Among Emerging Adults, 3 EMERGING
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B. Lack of Transparency in Algorithm
The IRS specifies that tax returns are selected for audit
through a variety of methods: random selection, computer screening or
scoring, document matching, and statistical formula. 183 Algorithms
are self-contained formulas for solving recurring problems, a series of
steps that can be applied to data sets. 184 According to the White
House Report (2014):
In simple terms, an algorithm is defined by a sequence of steps and instructions
that can be applied to data.
Algorithms generate categories for filtering
information, operate on data, look for patterns and relationships, or generally
assist in the analysis of information.
The steps taken by an algorithm are
informed by the author's knowledge, motives, biases, and desired outcomes. The
output of an algorithm may not reveal any of those elements, nor may it reveal the
probability of a mistaken outcome, arbitrary choice, or the degree of uncertainty in
the judgment it produces.
So-called "learning algorithms" which underpin
everything from recommendation engines to content filters evolve with the
datasets that run through them, assigning different weights to each variable. The
final computer-generated product or decision-used for everything from predicting
behavior to denying opportunity-can mask prejudices while maintaining a patina
18 5
of scientific objectivity.

While the IRS provides general information regarding the selection of
returns for audits, it does not reveal how the DIF algorithm, big data,
or predictive analytics algorithms are utilized to select returns for
audits. 186 There are numerous statutes addressing the need for
transparency in government action, including, but not limited to, the
Privacy Act of 1974, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the
Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act, and the E-Government
Act, which also address issues surrounding automated prediction
processes.18 7 If the government is making decisions based completely
on a computer model, the mechanism must be reviewed for procedural
due process and potential discriminatory results.1 8 8 Unfortunately,

ADULTHOOD 55, 60 (2015),
[https://perma.cc/E2PR-JR5C].
183.
RIGHTS,

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2167696814532442

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 556, EXAMINATION OF RETURNS, APPEAL
CLAIMS
FOR
REFUND
2
(2013),
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p556/

AND

[https://perma.cc/B8EG-P2TW]; IRS Audits, supra note 47.
184.

EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING

VALUES 46 (2014).
Id.
185.
186.
See Hatfield, supra note 19, at 337-42; Satran, supra note 165.
187.
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552a (2012); Federal Agency Data Mining
Reporting Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3 (2012); E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§
3501, 3601 (2012); Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1507 n.22.
188.
See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1271 (2008).
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the courts have consistently denied FOIA requests by taxpayers to
obtain access to these automated systems by citing I.R.C. §
6103(b)(2) 189 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), which exempt disclosure when
such disclosure might undermine law enforcement.19 0
1. Violations of Administrative Procedure Act
Federal agencies such as the IRS are subject to the APA. 19 1
The APA sets forth requirements for procedural due process in
rulemaking. 192 Section 551 of the APA defines a "rule" as an "agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . ."193It
can be argued that those who create algorithms that make decisions
impacting people's rights are engaging in rulemaking. 194 By failing to
a
in
engage
of
such
and
adoption
notice-and-comment period prior to the creation
algorithms, the APA may be violated. 195 Danielle Keats Citron cites
numerous examples of court cases where automated decisions systems
failed to pass constitutional scrutiny. 196 Because the IRS relies on

&

189.
26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2012).
190.
Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1510-12, 1512 n.54.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012).
191.
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
192.
Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 471 (1986).
5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
193.
See Citron, supra note 188, at 1288.
194.
See id. at 1288-91.
195.
See id. at 1264 n.97 (citing Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed Rule 65A196.
1.400 and ESS Online Benefits Application Form at 6, Tamara Clark v. Dep't of Children
Family Servs., No. 05-2105RP (Fla. Div. Adm. Hrgs. June 10, 2005) [hereinafter Clark Petition]
as "arguing that relative caregivers could not apply for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
due to the design of the online application in violation of Florida law"); see also id. at 1290 n.275
(citing Clark Petition, supra, at 7-8 as "arguing that Florida's Department of Children and
Families failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures for change in rule embedded in design
of Florida ACCESS online application that precluded relative caregivers from applying for TANF
benefits in violation of state law"). "Florida's Department of Children and Family Services settled
the litigation, agreeing to fix the system to allow relative caregivers to apply for benefits on
behalf of children as required by federal law." Id. at 1264 n.97 (citing Telephone Interview with
Valory Greenfield, staff attorney for Florida Legal Services, in Miami, Fla. (June 1, 2007)). "New
York's automated public benefits system similarly failed to offer 'battered qualifying alien' as a
choice in its drop-down menu for food stamp eligibility, thus precluding such individuals from
applying for food stamps." Id. (citing M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 418 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) as "granting preliminary injunction ordering New York City agencies to fix automated
system to comply with established policy").
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computers to make the decision on whether an individual will be
audited or not, important procedural safeguards are being ignored. 197
The secret nature of the algorithm 98 used by the IRS in
targeting audits also would seem to violate open-government laws and
regulations that are intended to provide the public access to basic
information about the conduct of agencies. 199 The notice-and-comment
rules are meant to allow the public to have input into changes in
policy that could impact their rights. 200 In addition, without a record
of the policy behind the algorithm, judicial review of such agency
decision making is impaired. 20 1 Private corporations such as IBM,
SAS, and EMC are behind providing big data sets as well as

197.
See id. at 1281. According to Citron, automated decisions made by the government
based on computerized algorithms often "deprive individuals of their liberty and property" in
contravention "of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
198.
See Satran, supranote 165.
199.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)-(b) (2012).
200.
Cass R. Sunstein, "PracticallyBinding": General Policy Statements and Notice-and
-Comment Rulemaking, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 513 (2016).
201.
See Citron, supra note 188, at 1298 n.327 ("[Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Electronic
Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 89
(1992)]('Judicial review necessitates a 'record' of agency decisionmaking.') . . . [s]ee also Gordon
G. Young, JudicialReview of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the APA: The
Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's Requirement of Judicial Review "On the
Record," 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179 (1996)."); id. at 1293-94 n.302.
Computer programmers also arguably comprise advisory committees subject to the
transparency requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA
requires advisory committees-those "established or utilized" by the President or an
agency for advisory purposes-to open their meetings, minutes, reports, and records
to the public. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(2), 10(a), 10(b) (2000). Courts exempt government
contractors from FACA's mandates because procurement regulations impose
transparency

requirements

on contractors

in

order

to

prevent

the

misuse

of

government resources. Food Chem. News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1403-92, at 2 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)). An argument can be made
that the contractors here-computer programmers-should not fall within that
exemption. Unlike the transparency provided by the contracting process that the
FACA exemption addresses, here, the key issue is the opaque nature of the advice
that software engineers provide in embedding new rules into an automated system's
code. Such programmers do not solely execute policy. Instead, they effectively provide
advice to the agency by changing established policy in the course of translating it into
computer language and encoding it. That advice is, in turn, adopted by the agency
through its automated decision system. Because FACA aims to secure transparency in
the policy advice given to agencies, the spirit of the statute counsels its applicability to
the consultants that design automated systems like the Federal Parent Locator
Service. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DuKE L.J. 17, 139 (2000) (questioning
whether private company running ICANN on behalf of Department of Commerce
should be covered by FACA's mandates).
Id.
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developing algorithms used by the IRS. 20 2 The creation of these
algorithms by private companies creates the additional issue of no
government oversight during the development of these algorithms. 203
This is problematic because courts are unable to determine whether
the policy behind the algorithm is an abuse of discretion 204 or if an
agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious. 205
2. Lack of Accuracy of Big Data
One of the curious aspects of predictive algorithms is that they
enable the creation of detailed individual profiles manufactured based
on aggregated data which may not even be applicable to the individual
selected for an audit. 206 These new inaccurate profiles result from the
initial data set being combined with the profiles of those with similar
characteristics. 207 The problem occurs when working backwards to
202.
Analytics and the IRS: A New Way to Find Cheaters, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2016, 11:45
https://www.forbes.com/sites/metabrown/2016/01/28/analytics-and-the-irs-a-new-way-to
PM),
-find-cheaters/#2fl6bb483187 [https://perma.cc/G2SB-QWQD] ("SAS founder Jim Goodnight
points out that the IRS uses SAS analytics products for fraud detection, as do the
Medicaid programs of every state."); Ian Armas Foster, IRS to Utilize Big Data to
http://www.datanami.com/2013/04/15/
15,
2013),
(Apr.
Improve Returns, DATANAMI
irs to utilize big-data-toimprovereturns/[https://perma.ccS4PR-9ZLV]; David Huber, SAS
(Dec. 9,
2011),
Fraud Detection Tools, WASH. TECH.
Arms
IRS with New
https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2011/12/09/sas-assists-irs.aspx
[https://perma.cc/H8HQ-KSNUI.
The Internal Revenue Service is getting a new weapon in its ceaseless battle to detect,

prevent and resolve criminal and civil noncompliance with tax law. SAS, a business
analytics software and services company, has won a $6.25 million contract to support

IRS's new electronic Return Review Program system, which is designed to help reduce
the $345 billion tax gap.
Id.; Jason Miller, IRS' Approach to Big Data Focuses on Business Outcomes, FED. NEWS RADIO
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://federalnewsradio.com/management/2014/09/irs-approach-to-big-data
-focuses-on-business-outcomes/ [https://perma.cc/84T5-2C8S].
However, it is questionable whether the current IRS rules and regulations are
203.
sufficient to manage the possibilities of big data analysis as they were written before access to
electronic data such as this existed. Foster, supra note 202.
204.

5 U.S.C.

§

706 (2012); KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE § 11.5, 204 (3rd ed. 1994) ("An agency action that constitutes an unexplained
departure from precedent must be reversed as arbitrary and capricious. ), cited in Citron,
supra note 188, at 1298 n.328.
205.
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-48
(1983) (holding the agency's rescission of the rule arbitrary and capricious because the agency
did not provide factual or evidentiary support for rule), cited in Citron, supra note 188, at 1298
n.329; cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971) (holding
the agency's decision to build a highway through a park arbitrary and capricious after a hearing
on the grounds that the agency failed to explain its decision), cited in Citron, supra note 188, at
1298 n.329.
206.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 160.

207.

Id. at 160-61.
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individualize the information from the large set because these other
characteristics may stick with the re-identification even though they
were not present in that individual's initial profile. 208 Barocas and
Nissenbaum (2014) have indicated in connection with such
re-identification issues that "[t]he willingness of a few individuals to
disclose information about themselves may implicate others who
happen to share the more easily observable traits that correlate with
the traits disclosed."2 0 9
Big data is able to create new profiles by using multiple data
sets that effectively re-create an individual's information based on
information obtained about others in the group that the individual is
lumped in, or on faulty data associated with the individual in the first
place. 2 10 Individuals misrepresent themselves on commercial websites
for a variety of reasons, not only to embellish themselveS 2 11 but also to
meet the requirement for obtaining what is of interest to them from
the website. 2 12 These misrepresentations enter the data pool and are
not identified as such when using big data in predictive analysis. 213 If
a pattern recognition algorithm is used on this tainted data to develop
a profile of noncompliant taxpayer behaviors, misidentifications are
likely to occur. It is easy to be seduced into treating these algorithmic
patterns as predictions of real behavior because they appear to be
objective. It is difficult to challenge inaccuracies of an algorithmicproduced data profile because the inaccuracies are not about the
individual's actual behavior, but rather reported behavior that may
have been intentionally misrepresented by the individual for reasons
completely unrelated to the pattern being predicted by the algorithm
itself. Thus, verification of the accuracy of the database is critical for
developing useful algorithms predicting behavior. 2 14 This is why the

208.
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress PredictivePrivacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 117 (2014).
209.
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data's End Run Around Procedural
Privacy Protections, 57 COMM. ACM 31, 32 (2014), cited in Landau, supra note 123.
210.
Crawford & Schultz, supra note 208, at 125-26.
211.
Susmita Baral, Lying on Facebook Results in 'DigitalAmnesia' Which Rewrites Your
Memories, IDIGITALTIMES (Dec. 31, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.idigitaltimes.com/ying-facebook
-results-digital-amnesia-which-rewrites-your-memories-403976 [https://perma.cc/7ASS-VC2C].
212.
Sandra Braman, Tactical Memory: The Politics of Openness in the Construction of
Memory,
FIRST
MONDAY
(July
3,
2006),
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/
fm/article/view/1363/1282 [https://perma.cc/B6QL-TWL7]; see also Facebook & Your Privacy: Who
Sees the Data You Share on the Biggest Social Network?, CONSUMER REP. (June 2012),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/06/facebook-your-privacy/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/4H4Z-MYS2].
213.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 32-49.

214.

Crawford & Schultz, supra note 208, at 119.
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IRS conducted the NRP audits to verify all information used to update
the DIF. 2 1 5

Both the Internet and data sets from data brokers contain
information posted online by either the individual or a third party.
Self-reported information online is notoriously suspect as it is often
designed to enhance one's self-image by strategically selecting how
and what to disclose. 2 16 Research on deception finds that in many
online social websites, exaggeration regarding oneself, also known as
airbrushing, has become the norm.2 17 Anyone who has ever been on a
dating website knows this very well. Facebook presents a slightly
different issue because others may choose to post on your wall, which
means you do not fully control the information that may be associated
with your page. A wildly conservative friend may post a video on your
wall with which you do not agree, but you feel no need to remove it. If
the government is collecting this information about you, it may
present an inaccurate picture of your politics.

218

Information posted

about you on a website you do not visit can also contain falsehoods.
The problem is those false data points could also increase your
chances of being unfairly targeted for an audit. An audit itself can be
viewed as a punishing experience due to the stress and potential
defense costs involved even if a "no change" order occurs. 219
By keeping the data collected proprietary, the IRS is effectively
preventing people from viewing and correcting information about
themselves that the IRS may be using in its predictive analytics. 220
This not only violates the FIPs but also is in direct contravention of
the Privacy Act of 1974, which incorporates the FIPs. 2 2 1 Since
individuals do not even know that there has been incorrect
information collected about them, they have no ability to correct this

BRIAN ERARD, COMPLIANCE MEASUREMENT AND WORKLOAD SELECTION WITH
215.
1-2, 4 (2002), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/compmewo.pdf
OPERATIONAL AUDIT DATA

[https://perma.cclK4LB-AJML].
Andrew T. Fiore & Judith S. Donath, Online Personals: An Overview, in ACM,
216.
EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1395 (2004).

Id. at 1398.
217.
218.
Joseph P. Mazer, Richard E. Murphy & Cheri J. Simonds, 171 See You on "Facebook":
The Effects of Computer-Mediated Teacher Self-Disclosure on Student Motivation, Affective
Learning, and Classroom Climate, 56 COMM. EDUC. 1, 3, 11 (2007).
Kelly Spors, Audit Nightmares: How to Cope When the IRS Comes Knocking,
219.
OPENFORUM

(2014),

https://www.americanexpress.com/us/small-business/openforum/articles/

audit-nightmares-how-to-cope-when-the-irs-comes-knocking/ [https://perma.cclYXB4-XH8N]; see
also Taxpayer Stories of Painful IRS Audit and Tax Experiences, EFILE.COM,
[https://perma.cclZY9Rhttp://www.efile.com/painful-taxpayer-irs-audit-experiences-tax-stories/
LUCE] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
Landau, supra note 123, at 504; see also Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1510-13.
220.
221.

Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1541-42.
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data that is being entered into the IRS database. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of the opportunity to disprove the data. 22 2 Previous
data analytics relied on sampling and the need for accurate data. 22 3
Today, big data varies in quality, 224 and computers have made the
ability to analyze large data sets possible in a way that could not occur
prior to their existence. 225 Accuracy is sacrificed for volume.
3. Potential Discrimination
Another interesting aspect of predictive analytics is that
algorithms can be programmed to "learn" over time. 2 2 6 While this may
be advantageous for companies looking to narrowly define their target
market, it creates a dangerous situation when the result is a targeted
audit. Thus, the programmer's initial purpose for developing the
pattern-recognition algorithm can change as the algorithm evolves
free from human intervention. 22 7 It can create its own identification
function based on the patterns it recognizes within the big data sets,
and these functions may not be consistent with the original
function. 228 Thus, the algorithm itself, while not initially set up to use
factors such as race or religion, may result in targeting certain groups
based on the associations created as the algorithm learns. 229 Because
the IRS collects and maintains highly personal information about
taxpayers, they can easily identify someone's race, gender, ethnicity,
and religion. 2 3 0
The New York Police Department came under fire for its use of
predictive analytics to focus its policing on certain communities. 231
Many of the areas targeted were primarily composed of minorities. 232
Because the use of predictive analytics relies on correlation rather
than causation, it is unable to explain why things occur, but rather
222.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 176.
223.
Id. at 32.
224.
Id. at 32, 176.
225.
Id. at 8-11.
226.
Melissa De Zwart, Sal Humphreys & Beatrix Van Dissel, Surveillance, Big Data and
Democracy: Lessons for Australia from the US and UK, 37 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 713, 718 (2014).
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?:
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 28 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big

-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf
[https://perma.cclK8YS-WAJ8].
230.
Hatfield, supra note 19, at 321-22.
231.

1 Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the

Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 17, 17 n.120 (2011).
232.
Id. at 16, 17, 17 n.120.
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what is predicted to occur based on the data set. 2 33 It is possible that
two things may behave similarly based on coincidence. 234 With
Spurious
correlation there is only probability, not certainty. 235
correlations are more frequent using big data sets. 2 36 No longer do
individuals have to come up with search terms to test; instead, the
proxies reveal themselves when big data is analyzed. Society is
moving from a hypothesis-driven approach to a data driven one. 2 3 7
Because predictive analytics does not ask why, it does not
reveal why people may have higher than normal expenses on their tax
returns. For example, many bankruptcies result from exceedingly
high medical bills. 2 3 8 This may be a reason for the unusual deductions
on a tax return, but not a reason for an audit. If it is found that
minorities have higher than normal medical expenses, this correlation
could result in minorities being targeted for audits in violation of
equal protections laws. The problem, of course, is that with a
secretive IRS and no access to the algorithm itself, claims of
discrimination would have little chance of success.
While current law prohibits discrimination against protected
classes, big data is not the panacea that many proponents allege.
Because of the potential correlation of characteristics that could
trigger an audit with those of a certain protected class, the
mathematical model could result in unfair treatment of such class. 2 39
In addition, data mining could "inherit the prejudices of prior decisionmakers." 240 As discussed by other legal analysts, access to an
automated program's source code would allow an individual to
challenge an agency's actions and show that the system may in fact be
biased. 24 1
In a recent FTC Report regarding big data, the potential
violations of law and risks of using predictive analytics on low-income
233.

Id. at 40, 40 n.246.

234.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 52-53.

235.

Capers, supra note 231, at 16.

236.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 160-62.

237.
Id. at 55.
David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results
238.
of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741, 743 (2009).
Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data's DisparateImpact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671,
239.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2477899
(2016),
720,
726
688,
[https://perma.cc/CK5E-PLUH].
240.
Id. at 674, 682.
Christopher W. Clifton, Deirdre K. Mulligan & Raghu Ramakrishnan, Data Mining
241.
and Privacy: An Overview, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 191, 203 (Katherine J.

Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006) (explaining that, without access to the underlying
data and logic of the "No Fly" program, individual's ability to challenge inclusion on list is
impaired), cited in Citron, supra note 188, at 1284 n.240.
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and underserved populations was explored. 2 42
This report was
prepared with input from a public workshop with big data
stakeholders. 2 4 3 The report reiterates that results from hidden biases
can manifest at either the collection or analytics stage, 2 4 4 or from the
This presents an enormous issue
algorithm's ability to learn. 2 4 5
because there is no way to verify that the IRS's use of analytics is not
resulting in discrimination.
4. Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action
In general, agency determinations may not be overturned by a
federal court unless the agency action is found to be arbitrary and
capricious. 2 4 6 As previously mentioned, the use of predictive analytics
may violate APA procedural due process in rulemaking requirements,
but it may also serve to provide a way to force the disclosure of the
analytics program being used by the IRS today. 247 According to
Citron, government-automated decision-making systems which are
kept secret have an impact on people's rights in a way that may go
unchecked. 2 4 8 She suggests the addition of "technological due process"
to ensure accuracy and fairness. 24 9
Citron points to the FTC's
auditing of CompuServe's scoring process for giving credit, which was
found to have used unfair criteria. 2 5 0 She suggests the FTC could be
charged with running

FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 229, at i-ii.
243.
Id. at i.
244.
Id. at iv.
245.
Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1508-12.
246.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002); High
Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 2016); Gardner v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 638 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011); Latino Issues Forum v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
558 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2009); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. Fed. Emergency
Mgmt. Agency, 371 F.3d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 2004).
247.
See Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1775, 1799 (2015) ("Core
liberties may be obstructed in a way that is rapidly evolving and systemic, however, nearly
impossible to detect because of the opacity and complexity of big data technologies, and the
administrative systems that support them.").
248.
Danielle Citron, Big Data Should Be Regulated by 'Technological Due Process', N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2016, 4:34 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/06/is-big-dataspreading-inequalitybig-data-should-be-regulated-by-technological-due-process
[https://perma.cc/KR76-7ZGS].
249.
Id.
250.
Id.
242.
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hypothetical scenarios to assess whether algorithmic predictions are statistical
proxies for race, gender, religion and disability-thereby cutting down the
possibility that the algorithms infringe on civil rights. The ever-present threat of
an audit would encourage the adoption of precautions and, perhaps, encourage
entities that are building scoring systems to be more mindful of concerns about
251
discrimination and inaccurate predictions based on polluted data.

While companies who use big data to perform targeted
marketing can profit even with low accuracy rates, 252 the government
is subject to a different set of rules. 253 A taxpayer's rights could be
affected if the algorithm results in the auditing of a suspect due to
payments that are correlated to a certain ideology or religion. For
example, high charitable contributions may be associated with certain
religions that observe tithing, or new home ownership with no
associated mortgage may identify religions with prohibitions against
usury charges. However, the IRS's analysis program could potentially
flag these types of line items on a tax return, resulting in unfair
targeting of those from a certain religion. If the FTC or a newly
created oversight board was able to review both the data for accuracy
and the algorithm for potential discrimination, this could help repair
some of the many problems with the IRS's use of big data analytics.
C. Data Collection
There are also potential issues with the IRS's methods of data
collection. The ability of the government to obtain information about
people is limited by the Constitution as well as federal and state law.
In 1967, the Supreme Court issued two decisions regarding the Fourth
Amendment with respect to private communications. 254 In Katz v.
United States, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" entitled an
individual to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her private
government
unwarranted
precluding
thus
communications,
intrusion. 255 In Berger v. New York, the Court struck down a New
York wiretap law as violating the Fourth Amendment because of its
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the privacy interests of

251.
Id.
Hatfield, supra note 19, at 343.
252.
See Citron, supra note 188, at 1281-82.
253.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
254.
63-64 (1967).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
255.
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those whose communications were being wire tapped. 256 The ECPA
was enacted in 1986 to extend these same privacy protections. 257
1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The ECPA was intended to protect private electronic
communications in furtherance of the two aforementioned Supreme
Court cases. 258 It described the limited circumstances under which
the government may obtain information stored by electronic
communications services and remote computing services from
providers. 259 It required the federal government to obtain either a
warrant, if the communication sought had been in storage for less
than 180 days, 260 or a subpoena, with notice to the customer, if more
than 180 days. 261 Section 2703(d) required the government to show
"specific and articulable facts, showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a[n] . . . electronic
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal

investigation." 2 6 2 The ECPA has been interpreted to apply not only to
emails but also to text messageS 263 and social media. 264 In any case,
the ECPA requires the government to provide notice to the individual
whose communications are being requested. 265
The ACLU has
obtained information indicating that not only has the IRS viewed
private electronic communications without first obtaining a
warrant, 266 it is likely not disclosing requests to taxpayers as required
by law. 267

256.
Berger, 388 U.S. at 63-64.
257.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
258.
Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1381, 1383-88 (2007).
259.
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
260.
§ 2703(a).
§ 2703(d).
261.
262.
Id. A Section 2703(d) order is similar to the Terry rule applied to law enforcement
stop-and-frisks, which requires less than probable cause to believe a crime has been committed,
but more than a mere hunch. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
263.
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008).
264.
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
265.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), 2705.
266.
Nathan Freed Wessler, IRS Says It Will Respect 4th Amendment with Regard to
Email, but Questions Remain, ACLU (Apr. 16, 2013, 4:07 PM), https://www.aclu.orgblog/irssays-it-will-respect-4th-amendment-regard-email-questions-remain?redirect=blog/technologyand-liberty-national-security/irs-says-it-will-respect-4th-amendment-regard-email
[https://perma.cc/6VUH-LZ5W].
267.
Id.
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In United States v. Warshak, the government obtained 27,000
private electronic communications with a 2703(b) subpoena and
2703(d) order under the ECPA. 268 The Warshak court ruled that the
obtaining of such private emails violated the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and that to the
extent that it permitted such retrieval without a warrant the ECPA
The court stated that the Fourth
violated the Constitution. 2 6 9
Amendment applies to electronic communications and that "The
Fourth Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of
technological progress." 270
Congress recently attempted to amend the ECPA to subject
governmental retrieval of electronic communications to a warrant, but
to date none of the amendments have passed. 271 As mentioned above,
despite the Warshak opinion, the IRS was still obtaining taxpayer
emails without a warrant until 2013, when they had to answer for the
practice in a Senate hearing. 272 An ACLU statement issued after the
hearing remarked:
Although Miller stated that the IRS Criminal Investigation unit obtains warrants
for all emails, he did not discuss other forms of electronic communication such as
text messages, instant messages, and direct messages on social media . . . . Under
the Fourth Amendment, a warrant should be required for those private
273
communications as well.

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010).
268.
269.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 285; see also Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A
270.
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2010).
See RICHARD M. THOMPSON, II & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44036,
271.
STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT: REFORM OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT

(ECPA) 8 (2015).
The ECPA Amendments Act of 2015 (S. 356, H.R. 283) and the Email Privacy Act
(H.R. 699) were re-introduced in the 114th Congress. Similar to the past Congress, the
Email Privacy Act has obtained a majority of the Members of the House as cosponsors (261). The Online Communication and Geolocation Protection Act, which
would make similar amendments to ECPA, was introduced in the 113th (H.R. 983)
and 114th (H.R. 656) Congresses. A competing bill, the Law Enforcement Access to
Data Stored Abroad (LEADS) Act (S. 512, H.R. 1174), which covers, among other
things, the extraterritorial reach of ECPA orders, was first introduced in the 113th
Congress and has been re-introduced in the 114th Congress.
Id.
272.
273.

Sampson, supra note 31.
Wessler, supra note 266.
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2. Warrantless Search
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things .... 274

As previously discussed, until 2013, the IRS maintained that it was
permitted to view private email messages on servers that were over
180 days old without first obtaining a warrant. 275 The Warshak court
was very clear that electronic communications-specifically, emailshould be treated the same as all other private communications and
are subject to Fourth Amendment protections. 276
274.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
275.
Audrey Henderson, The IRS May Be Spying on You Through Social Media, OPTIMA
TAX RELIEF (Apr.
29,
2014), http://optimataxrelief.comlirs-may-be-spying-social-media
[https://perma.c/2MAX-ZUE9].
276.
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285-86 (6th Cir. 2010).
Given the fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of
communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth
Amendment protection. . . . Email is the technological scion of tangible mail, and it
plays an indispensable part in the Information Age. Over the last decade, email has
become "so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essential means or
necessary instrument[ ] for self-expression, even self-identification." . . . It follows that
email requires strong protection under the Fourth Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth
Amendment would prove an ineffective guardian of private communication, an
essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve. . . . As some forms of
communication begin to diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect
nascent ones that arise. . . . If we accept that an email is analogous to a letter or a
phone call, it is manifest that agents of the government cannot compel a commercial
ISP to turn over the contents of an email without triggering the Fourth Amendment.
An ISP is the intermediary that makes email communication possible. Emails must
pass through an ISP's servers to reach their intended recipient. Thus, the ISP is the
functional equivalent of a post office or a telephone company. As we have discussed
above, the police may not storm the post office and intercept a letter, and they are
likewise forbidden from using the phone system to make a clandestine recording of a
telephone call-unless they get a warrant, that is.... It only stands to reason that, if
government agents compel an ISP to surrender the contents of a subscriber's emails,
those agents have thereby conducted a Fourth Amendment search, which necessitates
compliance with the warrant requirement absent some exception.
Id. (quoting City of Ont. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)) (relying on the following authorities
for the following propositions: Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwalk, Fourth Amendment
Protectionfor Stored E-Mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 135 (2008) as "recognizing the need to
'eliminate the strangely disparate treatment of mailed and telephonic communications on the
one hand and electronic communications on the other"'; Quon, 560 U.S. at 762-63 as "implying
that 'a search of [an individual's] personal e-mail account" would be just as intrusive as "a
wiretap on his home phone line"'; United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) as
"holding that '[t]he privacy interests in [mail and email] are identical"'; United States v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); United States v. Waller, 581 F.2d 585, 587 (6th Cir. 1978)
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Although the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity
to rule on whether predictive policing is constitutional, parallels may
be drawn to the IRS's use of big data to predict which taxpayers may
Andrew Ferguson concludes that "because
be noncompliant.
predictive policing does not provide personal knowledge about an
ongoing crime, or particularized identification of the suspect involved,
it cannot support the weight of reasonable suspicion." 2 7 7 In general,
reasonable suspicion requires corroboration of individual actions. 278
Because it is unknown how the IRS's algorithm is choosing returns to
audit, it is unknown whether they are using predictive analytics to
target individuals and businesses without proper constitutional
protections. If the IRS is not predicting future behavior, but rather
examining prior actions of a particular person or viewing tax returns
that have already been filed, it is possible that the prediction is based
on that individual's own behavior self-reported to the IRS. When a
return is filed, the taxpayer agrees with the following statement:
"Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return
and accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my
knowledge and belief they are true, correct and complete."27 9
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that
attaching a GPS device to a car and tracking its movements without a
search warrant violated the owner's reasonable expectation of privacy
and constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 280 An
argument can be made that just as a vehicle's movements allow for an
expectation of privacy, so too should an individual's online activities
from a home computer. 281 A government agency running data
analytics on the Internet and searching for tags that fit their profile of

as "noting the Fourth Amendment's role in protecting 'private communications"'; Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) as claiming that "[i]t goes without saying that
like the telephone earlier in our history, e-mail is an ever-increasing mode of private
communication, and protecting shared communications through this medium is as important to
Fourth Amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past";

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967)).
Andrew Ferguson, PredictivePolicing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259,
277.
305-06 (2012).
278.
Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983)).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & DEP'T OF TREASURY, OMB No. 1545-0074, FORM 1040:
279.
U.S. INDMVDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 2 (2016).

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
280.
Some have argued that all online activity is subject to the third party doctrine
281.
because the ISP would have knowledge of such activities. However, the third party doctrine was
established long before the Internet. While the third party doctrine may well apply to public
postings, such as a photo on Facebook where the user has not set her settings to private, the
same reasoning cannot hold for private online activities (such as a Google search).
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a noncompliant taxpayer could arguably constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 282 In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that using a thermal imaging device without a search warrant
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 283 The use of
advanced technology to essentially spy on a US citizen without a
warrant reached beyond the reasonable expectation of privacy. 284
Again, the analogy can be made to a citizen's use of the Internet from
a home computer. 285
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court held that cell phones
may not be searched without a warrant. 286 According to Orin S. Kerr,
a law professor at George Washington University, "[t]his is a bold
opinion" because "it is the first computer-search case, and it says we
are in a new digital age. You can't apply the old rules anymore." 287
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. indicated that cell phones contain
private and personal information and that
[o]ne of the driving forces behind the American Revolution was revulsion against
"general warrants," which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in
an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity. The fact that technology
now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the
28 8
information any less worthy of the protection for which the founders fought.

The IRS's use of cell phone tracking technology would seem to
be a warrantless search as well.
3. Due Process
There are both procedural and substantive issues that arise
from the government's use of big data analytics to categorize
individuals into groups such as the No Fly List and the No Citizenship
282.

Unreasonable

searches

by

the government

are

prohibited

under the

Fourth

Amendment. Essentially, individuals have an expectation of privacy with respect to their persons
and homes. However, government searches pursuant to a warrant or when criminal activity is
being committed in plain view would not be considered unreasonable. Muna Busailah & Stephen
P. Chulak, Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, Qualified Immunity and the Technological

Age, 2012 (6) AELE MONTHLY L.J., 501, 501, 505.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35, 37, 40 (2001).
283.
284.
David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J.
143, 208 (2002).
285.
It is important to distinguish for the purposes of this argument an individual's use of
a home computer from a computer at a library or another public place where there is not the
same expectation of privacy.

286.
287.
Phones

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
Adam Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphones: Supreme Court Says
Can't

Be

Searched

Without

a

Warrant,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

25,

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-cellphones-search-privacy.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/2TFV-NSZV].
288.
Id.
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List. 2 89 There is a procedural problem because of the potential for
wrongful inclusion due to errors that can have large consequences on
the individual classified. 290 These mistakes can result in serious legal
issues for the individual, such as the inability to travel or work while
the issues are resolved. 291 Furthermore, large amounts of data that
help the government identify "suspicious" people ignores the principle
of "innocent until proven guilty," which is a substantive issue and an
inalienable right of the people. 292 These issues are concerning until
the government can show, using accurate algorithms and data, that
big data is the least intrusive way that the government can go about
identifying these people. 293
The IRS's data collection activities potentially employ
of the
violation
a likely
privacy
safeguards,
inadequate
aforementioned Supreme Court cases. 294 Jennifer Lynch, a senior
staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San
Francisco-based privacy-rights group, told Bloomberg:
Especially with the IRS, I don't know why these agencies are getting access to this
kind of information. These systems treat every person in the area as if they're
under investigation for a crime-that is not the way our criminal justice system
295
was set up or the way things work in a democratic society.

4. Self-Incrimination
When an individual's life, liberty, and property are affected due
to a governmental decision, there is a fairness requirement. 296 The
Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, ... nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... 297

In general, individuals cannot be compelled to testify against
themselves in a criminal case. This includes the right not to produce

289.
Hu, supra note 247, at 1775-77.
290.
Id.
Id.
291.
Id.
292.
293.
Id. at 1796.
294.
Those cases are Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400 (2012), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Kay Bell, IRS Getting Sneakier in Tracking Tax Cheats, DON'T MESS WITH TAXES
295.
2014),
http://dontmesswithtaxes.typepad.com/dont-messwithtaxes/2014/05/irs
(May
12,
-sneaky-tax-cheat-tracking-via-facebook.html [https://perma.cclL4NL-3RZM].
296.
Citron, supra note 248.
297.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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private papers. 298 When the IRS views private emails and private
social media communications and postings, this could be deemed to
be
a
violation
of the
Fifth Amendment's
right
against
self-incrimination. 2 9 9 Although people feel free to speak frankly with
those they connect with on social media, the fact that these
conversations are placed in fixed form presents problems that verbal
communications do not. While wiretapping by the government must
be done pursuant to subpoena, the IRS's ability to collect data from
social media and online electronic communications that are meant to
be private can result in taxpayers being forced to testify against
themselves. If privacy settings are being ignored by the IRS and
private communications are being accessed by the IRS without a
warrant, this is akin to reading private emails without a warrant,
which is prohibited under Warshak.300
D. Other Federal Violations
1. Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 limits the federal government's use of
private data about US citizens and provides a mechanism for
individuals to obtain information about themselves maintained by the
government.3 0 1 This Act was passed at the dawn of the computer age
at a time when the public became aware of domestic spying by the US
government on its own citizenS 302 and was intended to curb the
government collection of private information about its citizens. 303
Specifically, the Privacy Act gives citizens the right to access
private information about themselves maintained by government
agencies, as well as a right to correct inaccurate information
maintained by the government.3 0 4 The Act also placed restrictions on
the sharing of personally identifiable information (PII) with other
government agencies and other entities. 305 Because the Privacy Act
298.
Akhil Reed Amar & Rende B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 870 (1995).
299.
Citron, supra note 248; see also Hatfield, supra note 19, at 332 n.77.
300.
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
301.
302.
Evan Stone, The Invasion of Privacy Act: The Disclosure of My Information in Your
Government File, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 345, 347-48 (2013).
S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 1-2 (1974).
303.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1)-(2).
304.
305.

The

Privacy

Act

of

1974,

ELECTRONIC

PRIVACY

INFO.

CTR.,

https://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ [https://perma.cc/RE4K-DFRE] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
("There are several exceptions to the Privacy Act for law enforcement. In addition, agencies have
also gotten around the restriction on information sharing using the 'routine use' exemption.").
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requires agencies to have a mechanism to allow individuals to correct
mistakes in the information kept by the government, it appears that
the IRS is violating this right by maintaining secrecy over the data
being kept and created about individuals. 306
It is generally understood in legal circles that certain
information-medical, financial, location, etc.-is meant to be kept
confidential. 30 7 Emails and private communications are undeniably
meant to be protected against government searches and seizures. 308 It
is expected that credit card information and banking information are
to be kept confidential as well. 309 Government intrusion is not just a
violation of law; it can result in a permanent loss of confidentiality, as
well as significant problems for affected individuals if PII is publicly
released. 310 US News and World Report reported:
While the [IRS] has declined to give details about what third-party personal data it
will use in robo-audits and data mining, it has told government and industry
groups that its computers are capable of scanning multiple networks at the same
time to collect "matching" comprehensive profiles for every taxpayer in America.
Such profiles will likely include shopping records, travel, social interactions and
information not available to the public, such as health records and files from other
3 11
government investigators, according to IRS documents.

Privacy experts, including the IRS National Taxpayer Advocate, have
asked the IRS to make public the information it examines in audits in
order to facilitate compliance. 312 However, this is not being done by
the IRS. IRS Commissioner Steven T. Miller testified that the

306.
See 26 U.S.C. § 8752(e) (2012) (limiting a taxpayer's ability to correct tax returns).
307.
Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal
Informationfrom Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1463
(2000).
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284-86, 291-92 (6th Cir. 2010).
308.
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as
309.
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
In the oft-referenced Target mishap, a teenager's pregnancy was predicted based on
310.
her vitamin purchases, which caused much grief and stress for her family. See Landau, supra
note 123, at 504 (citing Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html
2012),
16,
(Feb.
[https://perma.cc/74L7-MHSY]). Uber has also claimed that it is able to identify customers
engaging in one-night stands based on the data it collects about its riders. Id. (citing
https://web.archive.org/web/
2012),
26,
(Mar.
UBER
of
Glory,
Rides
Voytek,
20140827195715/http://blog.uber.com/ridesofglory [https://perma.cc/Q7SK-GZHN).
311.
Richard Satran, IRS Data Web Snares Mostly Low- and Middle-Income Taxpayers,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 1, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal
-finance/mutual-funds/articles/2013/05/01/irs-data-web-snares-mostly-low-and-middle-income
-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/JYN9-263L].
Id.
312.
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"stealth approach" is "less intrusive," 313 but Senator Charles Grassley
(R-IA) said the IRS is not doing enough to stop its "abusive intrusion
of privacy." 314 Section 11.3.14.12 of the IRS Manual referring to the
Privacy Act indicates that the IRS may only collect information
relevant and necessary to accomplish the purposes of the agency. 315
By collecting and amassing detailed data files on individuals, the IRS
is violating its own requirements as well as the Privacy Act.
2. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act
The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA)
is a 1988 amendment to the Privacy Act of 1974.316 The purpose of the
amendment, according to the IRS Manual 11.3.39, is to add:
Certain protections for the subjects of Privacy Act records whose
records are used in automated matching programs. These protections
have been mandated to ensure:
* Procedural uniformity in carrying out matching programs
* Due process for subjects in order to protect their rights
* Oversight of matching programs through the establishment of Data
Integrity Boards at each agency engaging in matching to monitor
the agency's matching activity. 317
The CMPPA allows the matching of computer data when legal
authority exists and it is appropriate for achieving the desired
action. 3 18
CMPPA is intended to ensure privacy, integrity, and
verification of any data disclosed for computer matching by the
government. 3 19 There are four factors that must exist for CMPPA to
apply: computerized comparison, categories of subjects, federal benefit
program, and a matching purpose. 320 Although certain matching
programs, such as the tax administration, are exempt from CMPPA, 32 1

313.

Id.

314.

Id.

315.
11.3.14.12 Privacy Act General Provisions, IRS § 11.3.14.12 (Sept. 12, 2013),
https://www.irs.gov/irm/partl1/irm_11-003-014.html#d0e426 [https://perma.cc/ZGY3-EDD2].
316.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, in DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE MANUAL COMMENTARY

§

3-17.000, at 3 (2015 ed.).

317.
11.3.39 Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, IRS § 11.3.39.2 (Sept. 17,
2013), https://www.irs.gov/irm/partl1/irm_11-003-039.html#d0e65 [https://perma.cc/J835-XV94].
318.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-44, COMPUTER MATCHING ACT: OMB
AND SELECTED AGENCIES NEED TO ENSURE CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION 13 (2014).

319.
Privacy Act of 1974: Final Guidance Interpreting the Provisions of Public Law 100503, The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,818-01, 25,818
(June 19, 1989).
320.
11.3.39 Computer Matching and Privacy ProtectionAct, supra note 317, § 11.3.39.7.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8)(B)(iv) (2012).
321.
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the Office of Management and Budget intended the law to cover the
tax system. 322 The IRS is required to:
* Develop, execute and obtain approval of a written agreement,
prepared in conformance with 5 USC § 552a(o), with the other
agency or the other IRS function,
* Provide notice of the matching program to record subjects,
* Prepare a report to Congress on the new matching program[, and]
* Prepare any Federal Register notice and report required (unless
prepared by the recipient agency). 323
FOIA requires that each agency "maintain in its records only
such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to
accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
statute or by executive order of the President." 324 Maintaining these
records violates the Privacy Act as well. In Clarkson v. Internal
Revenue Service, the Eleventh Circuit held that the IRS improperly
maintained records regarding the exercise of Clarkson's First
Amendment rights. 325 The plaintiff, a tax protester, was followed and
investigated by the IRS, who kept a file on him containing
surveillance reports, newsletters, and press releases. 326 The court
found that the collection and maintenance of these materials was in
violation of the Privacy Act, even though the IRS contended that the
records were not kept in a "system of records," since they were kept in
a general "Tax Protest File" from which the IRS said it could not
retrieve individual records by name. 32 7

FOIA also provides that each agency shall "collect information
to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject individual
when the information may result in adverse determinations about an
individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs."
The IRS is required to prepare a notice in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e) to notify the subject individuals that their records may be part
of a matching program prior to the actual conduct of the matching.
These are to be published in the Federal Register. 328

§

322.
11.3.39 Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, supra note
11.3.39.7.1.
323.
Id. § 11.3.39.8.
§ 552a(e)(1).
324.
325.
Clarkson v. Internal Revenue Serv., 678 F.2d 1368, 1374-77 (11th Cir. 1982).
326.
Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1373.
327.
328.
§ 552a(e)(4).
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In conformance with the CMPPA, the IRS conducts Privacy
Impact Assessments (PIA) on its collection of PII.329 The PIAs ensure
the following:
* The public is informed regarding the information that is collected;
* Any impact the collection may have on personal privacy is
adequately addressed;
* The IRS collects sufficient personal information to administer its
programs, and no more;
* The information collected is used only for the purpose intended;
* The information is maintained to be timely and accurate;
* The information is protected while the IRS has custody and the
IRS has custody only for as long as is necessary;
* Information is withheld if its release might harm IRS systems,
compromise law enforcement efforts or, jeopardize competitive
businesses. 330
The clear target of the Privacy Act was federal government
agencies. The Privacy Act empowered citizens with a right of access to
their federal government agency files along with a civil remedy to
enforce that right. 33 1 The Privacy Act also required an agency to
publicly announce its record systems that were meant to store
information about citizens. 332 Further, the government agency could
only maintain relevant and necessary information, 333 and government
agencies were restricted from disclosing information to third parties
without consent or specific exceptions. 334
By compiling and

329.
Privacy Impact Assessments-PIA, IRS (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/
Privacy-Impact-Assessments-PIA [https://perma.cc/NUK8-LLKQ].
330.
Id.
331.
§ 552a(d)(1) ("Each agency that maintains a system of records shall upon request by
any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is
contained in the system, permit him .. . to review the record and have a copy made of all or any
portion thereof .... ); § 552a(g)(1)(B) ("Whenever any agency . . . refuses to comply with an
individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this section . . . the individual may bring a civil
action against the agency . . . .").
332.
Id. § 552a(e)(4) ("Each agency that maintains a system of records shall ... publish in
the Federal Register upon establishment or revision a notice of the existence and character of the
system of records .... .").
333.
Id. § 552a(e)(1) ("Each agency that maintains a system of records shall maintain in
its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish
a purpose of the agency .... ).
Id. § 552a(b) ("No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of
334.
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to
a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains. . . .").
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maintaining comprehensive data profiles of taxpayers, the IRS is
violating the Privacy Act.
3. Internal Revenue Code Section 6013
Internal Revenue Code Section 6103 requires that tax returns
and return information 335 be held confidential and not disclosed in any
manner. 336 Where disclosure is permitted, Section 6103 generally
imposes strict technical, administrative, and physical safeguarding
requirements to prevent IRS employees from using or disclosing the
returns and return information in an unauthorized manner. 337 It also
requires the IRS to monitor and enforce compliance with those
requirements. 3 3 8 This includes keeping records that detail inspections
and disclosures of return information.3 3 9 There are criminal penalties
for IRS employees that willfully inspect data without authorization or
disclosure of information, and taxpayers have the right to civil action
for the wrongful inspection or disclosure of their return information. 340
However, there are numerous authorized exceptions allowing
information to be shared with individuals or agencies having a
material interest in the tax information. 341 For example, federal tax
return information is available to any state agency responsible for
state taxation to the extent necessary for the agency to fulfill its
mandate. 342
335.

Under I.R.C.

§

6103(b)(1) (2016), the term "return" means any tax or information

return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided for or permitted

under, the provisions of this title which is filed with the Secretary by, on behalf of, or with
respect to any person, and any amendment or supplement thereto, including supporting
schedules, attachments, or lists which are supplemental to, or part of, the return so filed. Under
Section 6103(b)(2)(A), the term "return information" means a taxpayer's identity, the nature,
source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets,

liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, over assessments, or tax payments,
whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation
or processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected
by the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or
possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for any tax,
penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense.
336.
Id. § 6103(a).
Id. § 6103(b)(5)(B).
337.
3
Id. § 6103(p)( ).
338.
339.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(i) (2012).
340.
341.
I.R.C. § 6103(d), (e), (i), (k), (1).
342.
Id. § 6103(a), (d).
(a) General rule Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as
authorized by this title-(1) no officer or employee of the United States, (2) no officer
or employee of any State, any local law enforcement agency receiving information
under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support enforcement agency, or any local
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Section 6103(k) specifically covers disclosure of return
information for tax administration purposes. 343 The investigation of a
taxpayer through Internet searches may involve disclosures of tax
information because a taxpayer's name and address is return
information. 3 4 This disclosure is only permitted if it is in order to
obtain information not otherwise reasonably available. 345 Thus, IRS
Internet searches on taxpayers may in and of themselves violate I.R.C.

§ 6103(k).
4. Data Quality Act
The Data Quality Act requires federal agencies to take steps to
ensure the quality of their data. 3 46
In response, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidelines for federal agencies
in order to ensure the "quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity" of

agency administering a program listed in subsection (1)(7)(D) who has or had access to
returns or return information under this section or section 6104(c), and (3) no other
person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to returns or return

information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), subsection (k)(10), paragraph (6), (10), (12),
(16), (19), (20), or (21) of subsection (1), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (in), or
subsection (n), shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any
manner in connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise

or under the provisions of this section. For purposes of this subsection, the term
'officer or employee" includes a former officer or employee.... (d) Disclosure to State
tax officials and State and local law enforcement agencies (1) In general Returns and
return information with respect to taxes imposed by chapters 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, 21, 23,
24, 31, 32, 44, 51, and 52 and subchapter D of chapter 36 shall be open to inspection
by, or disclosure to, any State agency, body, or commission, or its legal representative,
which is charged under the laws of such State with responsibility for the
administration of State tax laws for the purpose of, and only to the extent necessary
in, the administration of such laws, including any procedures with respect to locating
any person who may be entitled to a refund. Such inspection shall be permitted, or
such disclosure made, only upon written request by the head of such agency, body, or
commission, and only to the representatives of such agency, body, or commission

designated in such written request as the individuals who are to inspect or to receive
the returns or return information on behalf of such agency, body, or commission. Such
representatives shall not include any individual who is the chief executive officer of
such State or who is neither an employee or legal representative of such agency, body,
or commission nor a person described in subsection

(n). However, such

return

information shall not be disclosed to the extent that the Secretary determines that
such disclosure would identify a confidential informant or seriously impair any civil or
criminal tax investigation.
Id.
343.
Id. § 6103(k).
Id. § 6103(b)(2).
344.
345.
11.3.21 Investigative Disclosure, IRS (Apr. 27,
irm/parti1/irm_11-003-021.html [https://perma.cc/3WTV-GRC2].
44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(d)(1), 3516 (2012).
346.

2016),

https://www.irs.gov/
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information disseminated to the public. 347 The guidelines also address
the sharing of information between federal agencies and require each
agency to develop its own data quality assurance guidelines. 348 This
includes the requirement that each agency develop a mechanism for
individuals to correct information contained in that agency's
records. 349 The IRS is instructed to provide taxpayers access to tax
returns, tax return transcripts, and open-case-file work papers and
records. 350
The IRS has developed its own Information Quality Guidelines
pursuant to the Data Quality Act to comply with the requisite data
quality assurance. 5 1 All information and methodologies used by the
IRS are to be consistent with professional standards. 352 The IRS is
charged with ensuring the accuracy of the data contained on
individuals in its Customer Account Data Engine 2 (CADE2). 353 The
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), who
audits the IRS for compliance with the Data Quality Act, noted that
inaccurate data could make the CADE2 database ineffective. 354 In
2014, the TIGTA audited the IRS's validation testing process to
ensure that the databases upon which CADE2 is built were accurate
and complete and found that the automated validation comparison
tools and data-sampling methodology were sound, but the supporting
documentation was seriously lacking. 355 Further, the data coverage
and data defect reporting required improvement. 356 Some of the tools
used to compare and trace data back to CADE2 were insufficient for
validation; thus, the accuracy or completeness of the data is

John D. Graham, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity,
347.
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by FederalAgencies, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 24,
2001), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/fedreg-final-information-quality-guidelines/
[https://perma.cclC66Z-T8B2].
CURTIS W. COPELAND & MICHAEL SIMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32532, THE
348.
INFORMATION QUALITY ACT: OMB's GUIDANCE AND INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2004).

Id.
349.
Routine Access to IRS Records, IRS (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/routine
350.
-access-to-irs-records [https://perma.cc/SME7-P7DN].
351.

INTERNAL

REVENUE

SERV.,

INFORMATION

QUALITY

1

(2002),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/infoqualityguidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3XG-2E2E].
Id.
352.
See generally TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN. OFFICE OF AUDIT,
353.
CUSTOMER ACCOUNT DATA ENGINE 2 DATABASE VALIDATION IS PROGRESSING; HOWEVER, DATA
COVERAGE, DATA DEFECT REPORTING, AND DOCUMENTATION NEED IMPROVEMENT (2014),

https://www.treasury.gov/tigtalauditreports/2014reports/201420063_oa-highlights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G84S-KQZD].
Id.
354.
Id.
355.
Id.
356.
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questionable. 3 5 7
While the IRS agreed with the TIGTA's
recommendation to develop or improve its documentation, including a
manual for data validation, it disagreed with the detail necessary for
traceability of defects to unique data fields, claiming it was not
compatible with maintaining consistency across systems. 358 This is
most likely due to the large data sets the IRS is purchasing and
discovering through data mining. 359
IV. POTENTIAL MISUSE OF DATA AND ALGORITHM BY IRS

Although the IRS must be able to verify information provided
on tax returns, new technology has created a situation where current
law may not sufficiently protect US citizens from government abuse
and negligence. However, the IRS has very broad powers to identify
and investigate potential tax evaders, and due to both their reduced
budget and fewer employees, the IRS is turning to computers to
identify and investigate violators. 360 The IRS is collecting vast
amounts of data on US citizens, combining it with private information
found on individual tax returns, and compiling an incredibly detailed
dossier on all US citizens. 361 This is problematic because these
activities not only violate current law, but the IRS's history suggests
that continuing down this path could be very dangerous for US
citizens. The following Sections explain the potential harms that
could result.
A. Data Breach
The US government has had several major data breaches in
recent years. 362 The IRS's collection of personal data is creating a very
desirable target for identity thieves. In addition, the TIGTA recently
reported that 21% of FOIA/Privacy Act information requests answered

357.

Id.

Id.
358.
359.
Kerr, supra note 5; see also Sampson, supra note 5; Report: IRS Data Mining
Facebook, Twitter, Instagramand Other Social Media Sites, supra note 5.
360.

Robinson, supra note 4.

361.
Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 5; Sampson, supra note 5; Report: IRS Data Mining
Facebook, Twitter, Instagramand Other Social Media Sites, supra note 5.
362.
Massive IRS Data Breach Much Bigger than First Thought, CBS THIS MORNING
(Feb. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/irs-identity-theft-online-hackers-socialsecurity-number-get-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/KEJ7-XV3T]; see also IRS Computer Center,
CTR. LAND USE INTERPRETATION (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://clui.org/ludb/site/irs-computer

-center [https://perma.cc/TQ34-PKDD] (showing the location of IRS data center).
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363
The
by the IRS wrongly disclosed "sensitive taxpayer information."
IRS has a horrible record in keeping the American public's private
Recently, the IRS reported that more than
information private.
700,000 Social Security numbers had been stolen from the "Get
Transcript" function on its website. 364 A 2015 audit of security
procedures at the IRS performed by the Government Accountability
audit
previous
ignored
IRS
had
the
that
found
Office
recommendations and was failing to keep taxpayer data secure. 365
The report listed forty-three deficiencies, including the failure to
encrypt its data. 3 66
Given the highly sensitive information kept by the IRS, it is
risky to allow it to track and maintain large data sets about US
The IRS's failure to comply with the Privacy Act's
citizens. 367
instructions-to only use relevant private information, not share that

Zoe Crain, New TIGTA Report Reveals More IRS Incompetence, AMERICANS TAX
363.
REFORM (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:23 PM), https://www.atr.org/new-tigta-report-reveals-more-irsincompetence [https://perma.cc/5NE2-457X].
Massive IRS Data Breach Much Bigger than First Thought, supra note 362.
364.
See Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
365.
1065, 1102-03 (2003). See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-337,
INFORMATION SECURITY: IRS NEEDS TO CONTINUE IMPROVING CONTROLS OVER FINANCIAL

AND TAXPAYER DATA (2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-337 [https://perma.cc/E9UGLGNX].
The GAO has been warning about problems with IRS security since it started writing
these reports in 2007. In each report, the GAO has issued recommendations for the
IRS to improve security. After each report, the IRS did a few of those things, but
ignored most of the recommendations. In this year's report, for example, the GAO
complained that the IRS ignored 47 of its 70 recommendations from 2015. In its 2015
report, it complained that the IRS only mitigated 14 of the 69 weaknesses it identified
in 2013. The 2012 report didn't paint IRS security in any better light.
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audit and monitoring and failures to patch vulnerabilities and update software.
Id.
Paul Caron, The IRS Scandal, Day 1037, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 11, 2016),
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information with others, and discard it after use-puts everyone at
risk, especially since they are not disclosing what is being kept. 3 6 8
B. Misuse of Information and Targeting by Government
As detailed in Part II.B., the government has a long history of
misusing the audit function. 369 This problem is exacerbated by the
extensive information now being amassed on taxpayers. 370 During the
2012 presidential election, the IRS started flagging conservative
political groups for additional reviews to see if they were violating
their tax-exempt status. 371 According to Lois Lerner, head of the IRS
division that oversees tax-exempt groups, organizations with the
words "tea party" or "patriot" in their applications were targeted. 372
"In almost every administration since the IRS's inception," wrote
David Burnham, author of A Law Unto Itself: Power, Politics and the
IRS, "the information and power of the tax agency have been
mobilized for explicitly political purposes." 373
In 1942, the US Census Bureau began supplying data
regarding the whereabouts of Japanese-Americans to facilitate their
removal to internment camps. 37 4 Over 100,000 names were eventually

provided to the military, 375 and these individuals were then held in
internment camps until the end of World War 11.376 The records

368.
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at 154-55 (Comm. Print 1976) (expressing the Senate's purposes of its privacy bill as: respecting
privacy, accountability, responsibility, oversight, open government, prevention of illegal and
secret information gathering); id. at 295-97 (expressing similar concerns as those expressed by
the Senate).
369.
See Caron, supra note 367; see also supra Section II.B. This is an ongoing problem,
as illustrated by the IRS's recent targeting of conservative 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status
applicants.

370.
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372.
Id. This statement was made at a 2013 American Bar Association conference where
Lerner was a speaker. Id.

The IRS's Long History of Scandal, supra note 50.
373.
374.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 120, at 151.
375.
Haya El Nasser, Papers Show Census Role in WWII Camps, USA TODAY (Mar. 30,
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included name, address, age, sex, citizenship status, and occupation of
Japanese Americans in these block areas. 377
Many of the IRS's problems have been detailed publicly, but
even members of the Senate have criticized the continuous mistakes
made by this agency. 378 Senator Thune (R-SD) posted the following on
his website:
A look under the IRS'[s] hood exposes systemic troubles that continue to throttle
quality taxpayer services. Even 16 years after Congress passed sweeping taxpayer
rights laws, a culture of mismanagement continues to steer the IRS away from
sorely needed public redemption. Instead, misguided decisions and more violations
of taxpayer privacy clog its core mission to serve the taxpaying public with
integrity. . . . What's worse, the Government Accountability Office found that the
IRS sent out $5.8 billion in fraudulent tax refunds in 2013. Considering the recent
massive data breaches at the IRS and Office of Personnel Management, the federal
government is clearly facing a steep curve to thwart cyber crimes that put sensitive
3 79
personal information at risk of piracy.

C. Surveillance by Government (Big Brother)
Government is increasing surveillance and, despite laws
prohibiting the sharing of data among federal agencies, such data
sharing may become possible through combined data centers. 380 NSA
data centers are currently collecting and storing information, making
it easier for authorities to search for information already stored in its
databases rather than having to start from scratch when a suspect is
identified. 381 These cost saving measures could result in agencies
having access to the IRS database without citizen consent, in direct
contravention of data protection laws. This potential for sharing data
would seem to violate the Privacy Act of 1974, the CMPPA, and I.R.C.
§ 6103 because of the reduced costs in locating information from
multiple agencies on shared servers and the fact that they are
warehoused in the same locations. The intent of many of these laws is
to make sure the public is aware of what information the government
is collecting on them, as well as the ability to correct information
about them being used by the government to make decisions

&

Id. In Europe, the Netherlands governmental records were used by Nazis to round
377.
up and persecute the Jews (the numbers imprinted on their arms came from the IBM Hollerith
punch-cards numbers used by the data processing facilities at the time). MAYER-SCHONBERGER
CUKIER, supra note 120, at 152.
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378.
(June 19, 2015), http://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/op-eds?ID=aab87cf4-4117-4ab6b8f0-ec54ablacedb [https://perma.cc/3S7M-PMLK].
379.
Id.
380.
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381.
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concerning their rights. 382 The secrecy surrounding the data analytics
program and the type of information already held by the IRS is
creating an environment where unchecked surveillance can not only
create dire consequences for the public but also will preclude
determining whether someone is targeted for an audit by a legitimate
machine decision or political motivation.
V. CONCLUSION

To cope with the ever-increasing tax gap between what
taxpayers owe and what they pay, as well as the steady decline in its
budget, the IRS has turned to big data, data mining, and predictive
analytics.3 8 3 For the IRS, data analytics is not trying to predict the
future behavior of taxpayers, but predicting data that it does not have;
that is, predicting whether tax returns are compliant with the tax
law. 384 There are serious issues with their collection of data, mining of
data, and use of data.
The IRS is working on validating its databases, but the TIGTA
found that there are problems with these data sets and improvements
are necessary to ensure the accuracy of information collected on
taxpayers. 385 The IRS has been hesitant to trace defects in its data to
particular data fields, meaning that inaccurate data for a particular
individual may not be discovered, disclosed or corrected. 386
While individuals may consider their social media posts to be
private communications, when they make them available to the public
the IRS may view them. However, as the IRS collects this public
information and adds it to its private information, confidentiality and
privacy concerns become apparent. The IRS's databases are targets
for identity theft, as seen by the massive breaches in recent years.38 7
This is in addition to the IRS itself divulging private information to
inappropriate parties 38 8 and continually failing to protect taxpayer
information. 389
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With the budget reductions and loss of 14% of its staff over the
past several years, the IRS has been forced to do more with less. 39 0 In
turn, the IRS has chosen to use machines (rather than employees) to
make decisions.3 91 This entails the obvious benefit of efficiencies in
data collection and the ability to locate tax evaders. 392 There is
another legitimate concern that if the algorithms were made public,
taxpayers could find a way to game the system. 393 However, this
concern should not preclude consideration of the other concerns raised
in this article.
One of these other concerns is the fact that audits are both
extremely stressful and costly to defend. 394 They have also been used
as a political weapon by presidents and the government in the recent
past. 3 9 5 Furthermore, big data results are based on correlation, not
causation, and it is inappropriate to judge people based on correlation;
just because people share characteristics or interests does not mean
that they will have similar tax compliance behavior. 396 If, for example,
people with dachshunds are associated with overstating medical
expenses, is it appropriate to audit the medical expenses of everyone
with a dachshund? While this may seem like an unlikely example,
imagine if the commonality was race or religion. If audit targeting is
based on correlation, rather than causation, this can easily lead to
profiling and discrimination. 39 7
There is an enormous difference between selecting returns for
audits based on a comparison between a taxpayer's own return and
required third party filings (such as W-2s), and those based on an
unverified computer algorithm using data mined from the Internet. 398
The secrecy surrounding the use of big data and predictive analytics
by the IRS makes it difficult to flesh out how the audit function is
influenced by the use of big data, and the extent to which the IRS
audit-selection process is violating the law. 3 9 9 It does seem clear,
however, that because of the IRS's budget woes, it is turning more and
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more to data analytics. 400 More transparency by the IRS regarding its
data collection, data mining, and predictive algorithms would help to
ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws regarding due
process and privacy. 401 What is being sold as an efficient fraud
detection system may actually be the end of privacy as we know it.
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